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BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I):
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR
LAW AND RELIGION
Mark C. Modak-Truran*
[O]ne of the things a scientific community acquires with a
paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the
paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solu-
tions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the
community will admit as scientific or encourage its members
to undertake. Other problems, including many that had pre-
viously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the
concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too prob-
lematic to be worth the time.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
The continued vitality of religion in modern society has motivated
many scholars to revisit their assumptions about how religion relates to
their disciplines in ways which dramatically call into question the prevailing
paradigms defining that relationship. In sociology and religion,2 scholars
are revisiting, revising, or rejecting the paradigmatic assumption that the
modernization of society necessarily leads to the secularization of society.'
Scholars in anthropology,4 political science,5 international relations,6 and
2. See, e.g., JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASON
(1990); JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY & TRADITION 97 (2004) (arguing that a secularized modern dem-
ocratic discourse does not "involve endorsement of the 'secular state' as a realm entirely insulated from
the effects of religious convictions, let alone removed from God's ultimate authority. It is simply a
matter of what can be presupposed in a discussion with other people who happen to have different
theological commitments and interpretive dispositions.").
3. See, e.g., STEVE BRUCE, GOD is DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST (2002) (defending the
secularization thesis); Jost CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994) [hereinaf-
ter CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS] (challenging the privatization of religion but revising the other
main postulates of the secularization thesis); Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A
Global Overview, in THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD
POLITICS 2 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999) [hereinafter Berger, Desecularization of the World] (characteriz-
ing prior belief in secularization theory-"[m]odernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion,
both in society and in the minds of individuals"-as "mistaken"); Josd Casanova, Rethinking Seculariza-
tion: A Global Comparative Perspective, 8 HEDGEHOG REV. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Casanova, Rethinking
Secularization] (clarifying and revising secularization thesis).
4. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY
(2003).
5. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION AND
POLITICS WORLDWIDE (2004) (empirically defending he secularization thesis); CHARLES TAYLOR, A
SECULAR AGE (2007) (arguing that the "conditions of belief" have shifted from "a society in which it
was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is
one human possibility among others"); CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 194 (2004)
(arguing that "[m]odernity is secular, not in the frequent, rather loose sense of the word, where it
designates the absence of religion, but rather in the fact that religion occupies a different place, compat-
ible with the sense that all social action takes place in profane time."); Charles Taylor, Modes of Secu-
larism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 46, 51-53 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) (arguing that
"secularism in some form is a necessity for democratic life of religiously diverse societies" and propos-
ing a new kind of secularism based on a revised Rawlsian notion of overlapping consensus.).
6. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in THE CLASH OF CIVILIZA-
"TIONS?: THE DEBATE 1, 4 (1996) (arguing that "[t]he clash of civilizations will dominate global politics"
in part because of the fundamental differences among the seven or eight major civilizations that "are
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philosophy7 have also joined in the debate about secularization and the
changing role of religion in modern society and in their disciplines. For
instance, in Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, philosopher Hent De
Vries begins his book by claiming: "That religion can no longer be regarded
as a phenomenon belonging to a distant past, and that it is not a transhis-
torical and transcultural phenomenon either, is no longer disputed in mod-
ern scholarship."
8
Despite these important developments in other disciplines, the secu-
larization of law arguably constitutes the most widely-held but least-ex-
amined assumption in contemporary legal theory. Almost without
question,9 the contemporary consensus assumes the modern paradigm of
the separation of law and religion and a secular foundation for law. In
France, for example, the doctrine of la'citi requires secular solidarity (i.e.,
secularism) to take priority over religious freedom by prohibiting children
from wearing headscarves or religious symbols in public schools.' ° From
the perspective of the modern paradigm, religion constitutes "a special
kind of problem for the law" not a source of legitimation or justification."1
The "Law" determines the station or location of religion rather than the
other way around. In the United States, the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment 2 determines when and where religion can play a role in
public life, and the Free Exercise Clause determines when religious activity
will be protected from impingement by other laws. Except for debates re-
garding how the law should locate religion, contemporary legal theorists
spend little or no time considering the relationship between religion and
differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion."
(emphasis added)).
7. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF RELIGION (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002); RELIGION (Jacques
Derrida & Gianni Vattimo eds., 1996); RICHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATTIMO, THE FUTURE OF RELIG-
ION (Santiago Zabala ed., 2005).
8. HENT DE VRIES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE TURN TO RELIGION 1 (1999).
9. But see MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW,
COURTS (2007) (arguing for a religious ground for human rights); Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchant-
ing the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709 (2004)
[hereinafter Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law] (arguing that the indeterminacy of United States
law requires judges to rely on religious or comprehensive convictions to justify their deliberation about
hard cases fully, even though they can only provide a partial justification of their decisions in their
written opinions in terms of noncomprehensive legal norms because of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.).
10. Article 2 of the French Constitution provides that "France is a republic, indivisible, secular,
democratic and social .. " ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 84 (1995) (emphasis
added).
11. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and The De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 203,
212-13 (1998) (arguing that "religion is not viewed as a resource or a potentially helpful approach to
understanding the day-to-day issues of law" like "economics, for instance, or moral and political philos-
ophy, or feminist or critical race theory, or history, or (more occasionally) literary theory or sociology
or psychology" but as "a special kind of problem for the law"). See also Steven D. Smith, Recovering
(From) Enlightenment?, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1263, 1282 (2004) (arguing that "secularization is neither
as uniform nor as inexorable as it once seemed, it still dominates some sectors of the culture, especially
the academy")(citing Berger, Desecularization of the World, supra note 3, at 1-3).
12. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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the legitimation of law-they presuppose the modern paradigm and its sec-
ular foundation for law.13
Given the presumed separation of law and religion, contemporary le-
gal theorists appear perplexed by calls for government recognition of a
Christian foundation for the state by posting the Ten Commandments, dis-
playing creches on government property, keeping "under God" in the
pledge of allegiance, and allowing prayer and the teaching of intelligent
design in public schools.' 4 For example, Ronald Dworkin views the recent
revival of religious conceptions of the state-in his words "a tolerant relig-
ious nation"-as simply "anachronistic.' 1 5 Most other legal scholars char-
acterize this development as merely proposing a more permissive
interpretation of the Establishment Clause rather than an attack on the
law's secular foundation. This interpretation is often referred to as "ac-
commodationist '' 16 or "non-preferentialist" and allows government recog-
nition of "religion in general" as long as the government does not prefer
one religion over another. 17 Moreover, legal scholars have not seen the
proposal for government recognition of the U.S. as a Christian nation or
the continued vitality of religion in public life as sufficient reasons for re-
thinking the modern paradigm's separation of law and religion.
Non-legal scholars, however, have more vigorously denounced govern-
ment recognition of the Christian origins of the United States as proposing
13. While the current notions of separation of law and religion are primarily secular, John Witte,
Jr. has poignantly argued that "separationism is an ancient Western teaching rooted in the Bible" in-
cluding roots in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions
About the History of Separation of Church and State, 48 J. CHURCH AND STATE 15, 16-17 (2006).
14. See, e.g., McCreary County v. A.C.L.U., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding the display of the Ten
Commandments inside courthouses in Kentucky unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the display of the Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol with other monuments did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment ); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677
(1984) (upholding the display of a creche on government property); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v.
Newdow, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing for lack of standing the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
holding unconstitutional a U.S. statute inserting the words "under God" into the Pledge of Allegiance
and the school district's policy requiring daily recitation of the Pledge as violations of the Establishment
Clause with concurring opinions by Former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor arguing that
there was no violation of the Establishment Clause); Kitzmifler v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 2d 707, 708-09 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the required statement in 9th grade biology class
that Evolution was merely a theory not a fact and that "Intelligent Design is an explanation of the
origin of life that differs from Darwin's view" violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment and freedom of worship provision under the Pennsylvania Constitution.).
15. RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE 57 (2006) (making a philosophical argument that a tolerant secular state is superior to a "toler-
ant religious state" based on "two basic principles of human dignity").
16. Former Chief Justice Burger argued that the Constitution does not "require complete separa-
tion of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all reli-
gions, and forbids hostility toward any." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. Burger further characterized these
accommodations of religion as "the Government's acknowledgment of our religious heritage and gov-
ernmental sponsorship of graphic manifestations of that heritage." Id. at 677.
17. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 692 (J. Scalia dissenting) (arguing "that there is
nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer
and acknowledgement or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments") (empha-
sis added).
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a Christian theocracy.18 The Iranian Constitution provides an unambigu-
ous example of a theocratic constitution and the pre-modern paradigm of
law and religion. Article 4 provides that "[a]ll civil, penal, financial, eco-
nomic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws [including
'all articles of the Constitution'] and regulations must be based on Islamic
criteria."'9 In light of this example, the charge of theocracy for things like
posting the Ten Commandments on government property appears
overstated.
Further reflection reveals that in one important respect this charge
makes sense. It identifies an implicit presumption that the law is legiti-
mated by a particular religious tradition-typically the "Judeo-Christian
tradition"-as specified by the pre-modern legal paradigm. For instance,
Former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court Roy Moore, the "Ten
Commandments Judge," 0 maintains that he placed "a two-and-one-half
ton monument to the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the ro-
tunda in the Alabama State Judicial Building. . . in order to remind all
Alabama citizens of, among other things, his belief in the sovereignty of the
Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church."'" Moore's testi-
mony during the trial further emphasized that the Ten Commandments
monument was intended "to acknowledge GOD's law and GOD's sover-
eignty" and "to acknowledge GOD's overruling power over the affairs of
men."22 Moore's comments help clarify that under the pre-modern para-
digm, religion locates and legitimates the law. Rather than constituting a
problem for law, religion provides the fundamental values that are the
source of the law. Moreover, while the modern paradigm has dominated
18. The charge of theocracy has been particularly evident in recent popular books and articles
about the contemporary political landscape. See, e.g., DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR
AMERICA UNDER SIEGE (2006); MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN
NATIONALISM (2006); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF RADICAL
RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006); JAMES RUDIN, THE BAPTIZING
OF AMERICA: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S PLANS FOR THE REST OF US (2006); Ross Douthat, Theocracy,
Theocracy, Theocracy, 165 FIRST THINGS 23 (August/September 2006) (discussing most of these books).
19. THE CONSTITTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, art. 4 (adopted October 24, 1979,
and amended July 28, 1989) (available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/ icl/ir00000_.html). For an ex-
cellent analysis of the Iranian Constitution, see generally Larry CatAi Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions:
International and Religious Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 11
(2008).
20. Former Chief Justice Moore was named the "Ten Commandments Judge" when, as a circuit
court judge in Alabama, he refused to remove a plaque of the Ten Commandments that he had placed
behind his bench. Two high-profile cases were brought regarding this practice but both were dismissed
as non-justiciable. See Ala. Freethought Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522, 1544 (N.D. Ala. 1995)
(finding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge to Moore's Ten Command-
ments); Alabama ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1998) (dismissing action by State of
Alabama seeking declaratory judgment that Judge Moore's practices were consistent with Establish-
ment Clause.).
21. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming that the monument vio-
lated the Establishment Clause and the order to remove it). The court noted that Moore claimed, like
"southern governors who attempted to defy federal orders during an earlier era," he was not subject to
any federal court order below the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 1302. The Eleventh Circuit, however,
affirmed the district courts' holding that the monument violated the Establishment Clause and their
order to remove the monument. Id. at 1284.
22. Id. at 1287.
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Western legal thought since the 17th century, Moore's position and the Ira-
nian Islamic Constitution demonstrate that the pre-modern paradigm still
constitutes a live option in the 21st Century.
As part of a larger project challenging and moving beyond the pre-
modern and modern paradigms, this article focuses on the modern para-
digm and its notion of secularization. Section II will discuss the origin of
the modern paradigm as a reaction to the religious pluralism and the relig-
ious wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth century such as the Thirty Years
War in Europe (1618-48) and the English Civil War (1642-51) resulting
from the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation divided the Western
part of the Christian tradition into separate confessional institutions based
on different theological interpretations of Christianity such as Lutheran,
Calvinist, and Anabaptist. The Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anabaptist under-
standings of the relationship of the church and the state were substantially
different from the Roman Catholic understanding. Under the pre-modern
paradigm, only one of these understandings of the Christian tradition could
legitimate the state. This produced conflict and eventually war among
these confessional institutions for control of the state. Faced with religious
conflict and devastating religious wars, the modern paradigm attempted to
replace the religious legitimation under the pre-modern paradigm with a
secular legitimation of law based on the Enlightenment view of reason.
The secular legitimation of law under the modern paradigm attempted to
separate law and religion into autonomous spheres so that a plurality of
religious traditions could coexist within a state.
Contrary to the continuing consensus on the separation of law and
religion, my thesis is that two quandaries or crises for legal theory-legal
indeterminacy and the ontological gap between legal theory and legal prac-
tice-have called into question the modern paradigm and its notion of sec-
ularization of the law. To support this thesis, Section III will set forth a
definition of religion and religious pluralism and summarize the debate
about the secularization of law and its relevance for the modern paradigm.
Section IV will show that legal theorists (ranging from extreme-radical
deconstructionists to contemporary legal formalists) overwhelmingly agree
that the law is indeterminate.2 3 The law is indeterminate because there are
hard cases where the apparently relevant statutes, common law, contracts,
or constitutional law provisions at issue fail to resolve disputes. From a
descriptive standpoint, legal indeterminacy merely means that judges must
rely on extralegal norms to resolve hard cases. This may result in judges
relying on religious norms in contravention to the secularization of the law.
23. The consensus ranges from extreme-radical deconstructionists, such as Anthony D'Amato,
who have argued that even the United States constitutional requirement that the President be thirty-
five years of age is indeterminate, Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of
the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1989), to contemporary legal formalists, such as
Ernest J. Weinrib, who claim that "[niothing about formalism precludes indeterminacy." Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1008 (1988).
[VOL. 27:159
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For example, in a recent empirical study of judicial decision making, Greg-
ory Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew Morriss concluded that "religious af-
filiation variables ... were the most consistently significant influences on
judicial votes in the religious freedom cases included in our study."24 As
suggested by this study, the advent of legal indeterminacy has called into
question the secularization of the law as a descriptive assumption.
Legal indeterminacy thus shifts the burden of maintaining the seculari-
zation of law to normative theories of law. Within the modern paradigm,
these normative theories require judges to justify extralegal norms without
relying on religious convictions. Sections V and VI will discuss the main
types of liberal and republican normative theories under the modern para-
digm-represented by Max Weber, John Rawls, Jirgen Habermas, and
French secularism-that attempt to legitimate the law independently of re-
ligious or comprehensive convictions. Sections V and VI will also show
that these positions fail for several of the following reasons: 1) they deny
legal indeterminacy; 2) they are incoherent; or 3) they require establishing
a comprehensive secularism in violation of the Establishment Clause.
As indicated in Section IV, Steven D. Smith has also persuasively ar-
gued in Law's Quandary that the metaphysical or ontological presupposi-
tions of the practice of law are inconsistent with the presuppositions of
contemporary legal theory.25 The practice of law presupposes a classical or
religious ontology while contemporary legal theory usually presupposes a
scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism).26 Smith concludes that this
"ontological gap" between the practice of law and legal theory presents "a
metaphysical predicament" that "will require us to 'take metaphysics seri-
ously.' 27 Smith's argument suggests that legal theorists can no longer ig-
nore the issue of metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, but he
confesses that he has "no idea what the answer to that question might
be."28
Finally, my conclusion will argue that closing the ontological gap and
providing a normative theory of law consistent with legal indeterminacy
requires a desecularization of law and a return to a religious legitimation of
law. Desecularization of the law does not suggest returning to the pre-
modern paradigm. The pre-modern paradigm imposes a de facto Christian
24. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 501 (2004).
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 120 (2003) (noting "startling
correlations" between judicial voting on gay rights and judges' religious affiliations and arguing that
"[v]alues based on personal, including ethnic and religious, background influence judicial decisions not
because judges are especially willful but because many cases cannot be decided by reasoning from
shared premises of fact and value.").
25. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAw's QUANDARY Xii (2004).
26. Id. at 155.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 177.
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religious foundation on "the world's most religiously diverse nation,' 29 and
violates the Establishment Clause. While the detailed argument will have
to wait for a subsequent article entitled Beyond Theocracy and Secularism
(Part II): A New Paradigm for Law and Religion, this article will indicate
the trajectory for a new constructive postmodern paradigm of law and re-
ligion that embraces legal indeterminacy as a structural characteristic of
law which allows for a plurality of religious convictions to implicitly legiti-
mate the law and close the ontological gap. The unitary religious (pre-
modern) or secular (modern) legitimation of law appears to be an outdated
or erroneous assumption of pre-modern and modern paradigms that fails
to take religious pluralism seriously. Rather than proposing a fixed, certain
foundation for the law, I will argue that the legitimation of law depends on
the plurality of religious and comprehensive convictions in the culture.
Under the constructive postmodern paradigm, the text of the law must be
explicitly secularized (i.e., no explicit recognition of religion), but at the
same time, the law is implicitly legitimated by a plurality of religious foun-
dations. The constructive postmodern paradigm of law and religion thus
leads to the desecularization of the law.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN PARADIGM: THE PROTESTANT
REFORMATION & THE ENLIGHTENMENT
In 1861, Henry Sumner Maine characterized societies under the pre-
modern paradigm as "primitive" and maintained that they operated by the
"rule of religion" rather than the "rule of law."30 Maine's identification of
the "rule of law" with the advent of the modern paradigm and its seculari-
zation of law dramatically exhibits how deeply held or fundamental the
modern paradigm has been to conceptions of law and religion in the West.
Despite the pervasiveness of the modern paradigm, its origins in the Prot-
estant Reformation and the Enlightenment still shape many of the assump-
tions in contemporary jurisprudence.31 The shift from the pre-modern to
29. See generally DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY"
HAS Now BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION (2001) (chronicling the in-
creasing diversity of American religious practice and proposing a pluralistic vision for a new America).
30. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 22 (Beacon Press 1970) (1861).
31. Harold Berman's two volume work clearly provides the best and most comprehensive treat-
ment of the historical influence of religion on law and law on religion in the Western legal tradition. See
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 11: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II]; HAROLD
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 165 (1983)
[hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION I]. By contrast, the historical account in Section II
should not be taken to suggest a definitive historical account that could rival legal historians like
Berman. Rather, this account intends to isolate some of the key historical influences-the Protestant
Reformation (including the subsequent wars of religion) and the Enlightenment-that motivated an
eventual change to the modem paradigm. Also, the identification of paradigms as-pre-modern, mod-
ern, and postmodern-should not be taken to be neatly correlated to certain historical parameters.
These labels attempt to identify key assumptions about law and religion and indicate generally that they
had prominence during certain periods. For example, the introduction indicated that the pre-modem
paradigm is still advocated by some like Former Chief Justice Roy Moore even though the modern
[VOL. 27:159
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the modern paradigm arguably resulted from religious conflict and wars of
religion set off by the Reformation. These religious wars presented a crisis
for the pre-modern paradigm and motivated a re-conceptualization of
law-the modern paradigm of law and religion. The modern paradigm
provided a secular foundation based on Enlightenment rationality so that
law and religion could be separated into different autonomous spheres. To
provide an abbreviated account of how these historical events resulted in
crises for the pre-modern paradigm, Part A will briefly discuss the role of
the pre-modern paradigm in the Roman Empire, and Part B will outline
the crises presented by the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment.
A. The Pre-modern Paradigm and The Roman Empire
The relationship between Christianity and the Roman Empire
changed dramatically over the first three hundred twenty-five years of the
Christian tradition. Beginning with Jesus' arrest and crucifixion by the Ro-
mans,32 the Roman Empire persecuted Christians more or less for the first
three hundred years of the Christian tradition. The "charges" brought
against Christians included atheism (for rejecting the Roman gods and em-
peror-worship), anarchy, cannibalism (regarding misunderstandings of the
Eucharist), and gross licentiousness.33
In 312 C.E., Constantine battled with three others vying for the title of
Emperor. He had a dream the night before a key battle in which "he saw
the initial letters of the name of Christ with the words, 'By this sign you will
conquer.""' He painted the sign (Chi Rho) from his dream on his helmet
and the shields of his soldiers. When he won this battle, he attributed the
victory to the "Christian God" and soon thereafter became Emperor of the
Roman Empire. In 313, the Edict of Milan gave Christians "absolute free-
dom of conscience, placed Christianity on a full legal equality with any re-
ligion of the Roman world, and ordered the restoration of all church
property confiscated in the recent persecution."35 Constantine viewed
Christianity as an asset in his process of unification resulting in "one Em-
peror, one law, and one citizenship for all free men .... [and] one relig-
ion."'36 He further unified theological divisions within the Church by
calling the First General Council of the Church in Nicaea in May 325. The
Council of Nicaea produced the Creed of Nicaea recognizing the divine
and human nature of Christ.37
paradigm appears to still dominate contemporary understandings of the relationship between law and
religion.
32. See, e.g., Mark 14:43-15:39 (The Jerusalem Bible: Reader's Edition (1966)).
33. WILLISTON WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, 43, 45 (3d ed. 1970) (revised
by Robert T. Handy).
34. Id. at 101.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 108-09. Note that the Nicene Creed so central to the liturgical practices of many Chris-
tian denominations is different from the Creed of Nicaea of 325. The Nicene Creed is of unknown
origin and was officially approved in 451 at Chalcedon. DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 24-26
(Henry Bettenson ed., 2d ed. 1963).
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Constantine's unification of the Roman Empire with Christianity pro-
vides the archetype of the pre-modern paradigm. From Constantine's reign
up through the Middle Ages, "the accepted idea was that church and state,
while in principle distinct societies, were united in one commonwealth (the
corpus Christianum): the distinction between them was to be seen chiefly in
their separate hierarchies (pope and emperor, etc.) with their different
functions and in the systems of law they administered."38 After the fall of
the Roman Empire, the Western portion (i.e., modern day Europe and the
United Kingdom) broke up into smaller kingdoms and principalities but
still looked to a common Christian tradition as the source of legitimacy for
the rulers and their laws. The Church continued to function as a common
bond among these kingdoms and principalities that outlived the Empire.
Harold Berman refers to this as "a society of plural secular polities within a
single ecclesiastical state."39 Subsequent aristocratic rulers and Popes con-
tinued to fight over the boundaries of their authority regarding the church
and state. However, although on a smaller scale, the pre-modern paradigm
of a Christian commonwealth was not seriously challenged until the Protes-
tant Reformation.
With respect to legitimating law, St. Thomas Aquinas's theory of natu-
ral law constitutes the classic medieval statement of how the law was ex-
pected to meet Christian standards under the pre-modern paradigm.
Aquinas argues (based on his rational proofs for the existence of God) that
the universe is governed by Divine Reason which is eternal. "Wherefore
the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe
has the nature of a law."40 The eternal law is thus the Divine Reason that
rules the universe. Aquinas further maintained that human law is not legit-
imate unless it meets the dictates of natural law which is "nothing else than
the rational creature's participation of the eternal law."41 Through natural
law (right reason), humans have an objective link to the eternal law or the
Divine Reason. Natural law provides the standard for determining legal
validity so "that which is not just seems to be not law at all.... but a perver-
sion of law."42
Despite the powers of human reason, Aquinas argues that the human
law is an imperfect participation in the Divine wisdom or the eternal law.
Humans know the general principles of the eternal law through reason, but
they do not know the Divine Wisdom in each particular case.43 Further,
the human participation in the eternal law (natural law) only assists in or-
dering the state with respect to its natural end. The Divine Law or revela-
tion is required for humans to know the full extent of the eternal law and
38. A. R. Vidler, Church and State, in THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 92
(James F. Childress & John MacQuarrie eds. 1986).
39. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 61.
40. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 91, art. 1, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS 748 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945).
41. Id., q. 91, art. 2, at 750 & q. 95, art. 2, at 784.
42. Id., q. 95, art. 2, at 784.
43. Id., q. 91, a. 3, at 750-52.
[VOL. 27:159
2007] BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I) 169
for humans to order the state in such a way as to assist individuals in attain-
ing Beatitude and salvation. Aquinas argued that sacred science (revela-
tion) is necessary for the salvation of humans "because man is directed to
God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason" and because the
truths about God that can be determined by reason would otherwise "only
be known by a few."44 Aquinas also claimed that sacred doctrine (the
whole truth) could not be inconsistent with natural reason (partial truth).
"Since therefore grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural rea-
son should minister to faith."45 In other words, under the pre-modern con-
ception of law, the validity of law finally depends upon religious truths (the
eternal law or Divine Reason) even if reason cannot discern all theological
truths.
B. The Protestant Reformation and Religious Wars
Two distinctive but related historical developments challenged the pre-
modern paradigm of a Christian commonwealth-the Protestant Reforma-
tion and the Enlightenment. The Protestant Reformation symbolically be-
gan with Martin Luther's posting of his 95 Theses on the door of the Castle
Church at Wittenberg on October 31, 1517.46 Luther intended to reform
the Roman Catholic Church. Instead, he started a revolution in Christian-
ity that lead to many reformers in other parts of Europe (e.g., John Calvin
(France), Ulrich Zwingli (Switzerland), John Knox (Scotland), Thomas
Cranmer (England)) initiating a split from the Roman Papacy and the
eventual development of what we now call Protestant denominations of
Christianity.47 Harold Berman summarizes the religious and political
repercussions of the Reformation as a transformation of Western Christen-
dom "from a society of plural secular polities within a single ecclesiastical
state into a society of plural Christian confessions, each identified politi-
cally with one or more particular secular states."48
The radical theological differences among the different Christian con-
fessions made the subsequent conflict and wars of religion hard to avoid.
For example, Luther, Calvin, and the Radical Reformers not only rejected
the Roman Catholic notion of a Christian commonwealth but also rejected
each other's alternative notions of the relationship between the church and
the state.49 Luther maintains that God ordained two governments, the
44. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-I, q. 1, a. 1, in 1 BAsic WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS 6 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945).
45. Id., q. 1, a. 8, at 14.
46. Walker, supra note 33, at 185-91.
47. The focus on the Protestant Reformation is not intended to ignore the split in 1054 between
the Eastern and Western parts of the Christian Tradition. Rather, my focus is on the development of
Western conceptions of law and religion so the Roman Catholic tradition in Western Christianity is
much more central to these developments.
48. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 61 (technically discussing only the
"Lutheran reformation" but his characterization appears relevant to the broader Protestant Reforma-
tion as well).
49. See generally CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 241-403 (Michael W. McCon-
nell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECrIvEs]
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spiritual (the kingdom of God) "by which the Holy Spirit produces Chris-
tians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains
the un-Christian and wicked so that-no thanks to them-they are obliged to
keep still and to maintain an outward peace."'50 Luther criticizes the pope,
bishops, and priests for becoming temporal princes rather than preaching
the Word of God by punishing usury, robbery, adultery, murder, and other
evil deeds with letters of excommunication. 5' In other words, they confuse
the temporal realm of external affairs which should be the domain of the
temporal authorities with the internal realm of the soul which should be
their realm. Rather, in the kingdom of the world, the unrighteous need the
civil authorities and civil law to instruct and compel them to do what is
good; the civil law restrains wickedness (both of non-Christians and Chris-
tians who do not lead a Christian life). Luther further claims that "the
masses are and always will be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized
and Christian in name. Christians are few and far between. Therefore, "it
is out of the question that there should be a common Christian government
over the whole world, or indeed over a single country or any considerable
body of people, for the wicked always outnumber the good."52
By contrast, the Kingdom of God under Christ is ruled by the Word of
God and is for the purpose of producing righteousness. The Church (i.e.,
the Pope, the fathers, and the councils) is not the authority which governs
this kingdom. The Word of God alone governs this realm. The Word of
God is the center of authority and of religious experience (sola scriptura -
Scripture alone). "Faith comes through hearing and hearing through the
Word of God."53 Further, "[a]mong Christians there shall be no authority;
rather all are alike subject to one another."5 4 "[A]II are equal and have the
same right, power, possession, and honor, and where no one desires to be
the other's superior, but each the other's subordinate" (i.e., the priesthood
of all believers).5 In the Kingdom of God, there is no need of temporal
law or the sword. Christians are little Christ's to one another because "the
righteous man of his own accord does all and more than the law de-
mands."56 This kingdom is ruled by the Holy Spirit without law.
(including articles discussing Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Anabaptist, Baptist, and Lutheran perspec-
tives on the law and religion).
50. Martin Luther, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should be Obeyed (1523) (J. J.
Schindel trans. & rev.'d Walther 1. Brandt) in 45 LUTHER'S WORKS: THE CHRISTIAN IN SOCIETY II 91
(Wather I Brandt ed. (1962). See also David M. Smolin, A House Divided: Anabaptist and Lutheran
Perspectives on the Sword, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 49, at 370; Marie A. Failinger &
Patrick R. Keifert, Making Our Home in the Works of God: Lutherans on the Civil Use of the Law, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 49, at 386; Marie A. Failinger, The Justice Who Wouldn't Be
Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom of Faith Traditions, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 643 (1998)(discuss-
ing Lutheran conceptions of law and the state).
51. Luther, Temporal Authority, supra note 50, at 116-17.
52. Id. at 91.
53. Id. at 117-18.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 89.
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The Anabaptist position of the Radical Reformation separated these
two realms even further and maintained a radical separation between the
church and the world.57 The Radical reformers argued that there ought to
be such great perfection in the church that its government should suffice
for law. Within the believing community, there would be not need for
courts, laws, magistrates, etc., 58 and the church and the world should re-
main separate. 59 For example, they argue that Christians cannot piously
sue another before a court because revenge is forbidden.
Thomas Shaffer further notes that for the radical reformers, "the
church is a community constituted by forgiveness."60 Through forgiveness,
Christians attempt to transform the members of the community and main-
tain their relationship to the community. This is crucial because salvation is
a communal process. Shaffer emphasizes that the Reformation doctrine of
justification based on grace alone presents a problem of motivation.
"[I]f God forgives sin and enters into fellowship with people
purely because He wills to do so, and without regard to
what people do-then what reason is there for this redeemed
people to behave themselves? The Anabaptist answer was
that reconciliation with God (salvation, justification) is
more a process than an event, and the process is commu-
nal-that is, it is a dynamic process, in a believers' church
that is forgiven and that forgives."61
On the other hand, "'the world' is in rebellion" from God.62 The
church does not attempt to transform the world into the Kingdom of God,
but to maintain its separateness from it. Shaffer clarifies, however, that
57. John Leith underscores that "[t]he Radical Reformers were disappointed with the reform of
Luther and of Zwingli, and with all the established Protestant Churches. They were united in the
opposition to a church that was officially related to the state." CREEDS OF THE CHURCHES: A READER
IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE FROM THE BIBLE TO THE PRESENT 281 (John H. Leith ed., 3rd ed. 1983). With
respect to theology, however, he maintains that "[tihe Radical or Left Wing of the Reformation con-
tained such a variety of theologies that generalizations are impossible. One study of church-type in the
"Left Wing of the Reformation' distinguishes four types: 1. Anabaptists (including Swiss Brethren,
South German Brethren, Hutterites, Dutch Mennonites); 2. Anti-Trinitarians; 3. Spiritualizers; 4. revo-
lutionary prophets." Id. (citing FRANK LUITELL, THE ANABAPTIST VIEW OF THE CHURCH (2d ed.
1958)).
58. The Schleitheim Confession (1527), art. 6, in Id. at 289 (maintaining that "it is not appropriate
for a Christian to serve as a magistrate"). Leith notes that "[t]he Schleitheim Confession originated in a
meeting of the Swiss Brethren on February 24, 1527. It was widely circulated among the Anabaptists
and was the subject of refutation by Zwingli and Calvin. The author was Michael Sattler, who was to
pay for his conviction, in May 1527, with his life." Id. at 281.
59. Id., art. 4, at 285-87 (advocating separation "from the evil and from the wickedness which the
devil planed in the world" and withdrawal from non-believers and from "all popish and antipopish
works and church services, meetings and church attendance, drinking houses, civic affairs," etc. and
denouncing "devilish weapons of force-such as sword, armor and the like, and all their use [either] for
friends or against one's enemies-by the word of Christ, Resist not [him that is] evil").
60. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Radical Reformation and the Jurisprudence of Forgiveness, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 49, at 321.
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 322.
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"the community of believers is prophetic, enjoying and practicing 'a holi-
ness that requires prophetic protest and action directed at any situation
where people's lives are being diminished or destroyed.' '"63 In other
words, the Church seeks the welfare of the world but does not have any
aspirations of making the world Christian. The Church does not wield the
sword. Christians "can 'serve the world but are not called to rule it.'
' 64
Christians are called to rely solely on nonviolent means of persuading the
world.
Rather than separating the church and the world, John Calvin at-
tempts to transform the world into the Kingdom of God. He argues that
the "civil government has as its appointed end, so long as we live among
men, to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound
doctrine of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to the
society of men, to form our social behavior to civil righteousness, to recon-
cile us with one another, and to promote general peace and tranquility."65
By contrast, the Radical Reformers argued that there ought to be such
great perfection in the Church that its government should suffice for law
within the Church. However, Calvin maintains that "since the insolence of
evil men is so great, their wickedness so stubborn, that it can scarcely be
restrained by extremely severe laws, what do we expect them to do if they
see that their depravity can go scot-free-when not power can force them
to cease doing evil."'66 Like Luther, Calvin maintains that the state exists
because of sin, and it restrains wickedness and preserves order. Contrary
to Luther, Calvin contends that the state also has a pedagogical task of
helping to form good Christians (i.e., the state itself has religious signifi-
cance).67 In addition, Calvin commits "to civil government the duty of
rightly establishing religion."68 Furthermore, in the sixteenth century,
Berman emphasizes that "the Calvinists belief in the ultimate authority in
ecclesiastical matters of the elders of the local congregation of the faithful"
contrasts dramatically "with the Lutheran belief in the ultimate authority in
ecclesiastical matters of the territorial prince."69 Thus, for Calvin, the state
has both a secular purpose of protecting citizens and a religious purpose of
promoting the love of God but control of ecclesiastical matters belongs in
the hands of local religious congregations.
63. Id. at 336.
64. Id. at 337.
65. 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1487 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford
Lewis Battles trans., 1960).
66. Id. at [Inst. IV., xx, 2].
67. See id. at 1488. Calvin further argues that the state:
also prevents idolatry, sacrilege against God's name, blasphemies against his truth, and other
public offenses against religion from arising and spreading among the. people; it prevents the
public peace from being disturbed; it provides that each man may keep his property safe and
sound; that men may carry on blameless intercourse among themselves; that honest and mod-
esty may be preserved among men. In short, it provides that a public manifestation of religion
may exist among Christians, and that humanity be maintained among men.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 58.
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While this discussion only highlights a few of the disagreements among
the reformers and the Roman Catholic Church, the rejection of the Roman
Catholic understanding of a Christian commonwealth by Luther, Calvin,
and the Radical Reformers should be clear. The importance of this disa-
greement for producing conflict among these groups follows from their
continued adherence to the pre-modern paradigm. In this "'confessional-
ization of Europe,"' Berman stresses that "[e]ach of the confessions be-
came identified with the territories whose rulers proclaimed it."7 For a
stable social order, rulers and subjects supposedly had to share a common
religion to legitimate the state and the law and to promote social coopera-
tion. Imagine how minority groups of Anabaptists and Calvinists (believ-
ing in congregational control of ecclesiastical matters) would respond to
edicts by Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Anglican aristocracy regarding ec-
clesiastical practices. Similarly, Lutherans and Anabaptists would object to
Roman Catholic and Calvinist attempts to hold the state accountable to
Christian standards. Calvinists would further object to governing the state
primarily according to rational natural law principles rather than primarily
according to scripture because human rational capabilities are usually de-
praved and corrupt without divine guidance.
Despite these theologically-based tensions, the kingdom's (or princi-
pality's) official version of the Christian religion was imposed on the peo-
ple by their rulers, and those resisting the official religion were persecuted.
Social stability was thought to require uniformity of religious belief. For
example, "[i]n the early 1520s Denmark (and eventually Norway and Ice-
land, which were under Danish control) and Sweden (and Finland, which
was under Swedish control) adopted a rigid state-mandated Lutheranism,
with severe criminal penalties for open adherence to a non-Lutheran
faith."'" Similarly, Calvinist evangelicals in France, often referred to as
Huguenots, experienced serious religious persecution. Berman notes that
"[r]epression of Calvinism burst into civil war in 1562, and over the next
thirty-six years a total of eight successive civil wars, known collectively as
the Wars of Religion, were fought by royal Roman Catholic forces to put
down the urban Huguenot uprisings."72 Berman further emphasizes that
"England itself, starting in the 1520s and 1530s, was torn by conflict be-
tween various forms of Protestantism, on the one hand, and a new non-
Roman Anglicanism, on the other, while Anglicanism itself was torn be-
tween its original Roman Catholic theology and later Protestant theologi-
cal and political influences."73 Roman Catholicism was also "outlawed in
1534 by Henry VIII and again by his son, Edward VI, restored in 1553 by
Henry's daughter, Queen Mary, and outlawed again by his younger daugh-
ter, Queen Elizabeth, in 1558."" 4
70. Id. at 61.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 58-59.
73. Id. at 59.
74. Id.
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Berman concludes that "the confessionalization of Europe, that is, the
virtual unification of church and state within each of the various European
polities, ... led to the first Great European War, the Thirty Years' War of
1618-1648. ' '7" The Thirty Years War exacted a tremendous toll on Europe.
Four million people died in Germany alone reducing the population from
twelve million to eight million.7 6 In 1648, the Protestants and Catholics
ended the Thirty Years' War by entering into two multilateral treaties, the
treaties of Minster and Osnabriuck, often referred to as the "Peace of
Westphalia".77 The Peace of Westphalia usually marks the beginning of the
modern nation state, modern international law, and a new constitutional
principle of limited religious liberty.7s The recognition of equal sovereignty
of each German principality, Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Aus-
tria-all formerly part of the Holy Roman Empire-also signaled the de-
creasing significance and power of the Empire. Moreover, these changes
are so significant that some scholars even mark the beginning of Modernity
by the Peace of Westphalia. 9
For the purposes of the modern paradigm of law and religion, the most
important aspect of the Peace of Westphalia involves the reaffirmation of
"the principle of royal supremacy over both church and state" and "the
new constitutional principle of limited religious toleration. 8 0 While the
religion of the ruler was still the official religion of each territory, the Peace
of Westphalia protected the religious liberty of Catholic, Lutheran, and
Calvinist subjects whose religion differed from that of their ruler.81 From
this perspective, the modern paradigm can be seen as mainly a reaction to
the religious pluralism and wars of religion following the Protestant Refor-
mation. To take this as the end of the story, however, would be to ignore
the important role of the Enlightenment in the 16th and 17th centuries for
providing a new foundation for law.
C. The Enlightenment and the Modern Paradigm
In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Stephen Toulmin
argues that the Enlightenment (usually seen as the beginning of Moder-
nity) had two beginnings.8" The Renaissance humanists from Erasmus on,
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id.
77. See WALKER, supra note 33, at 389-96.
78. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 62.
79. STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOL1s: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY 7, 90-93 (1990).
80. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 62.
81. The Peace of Westphalia, 1648, in DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, supra note 37, at
216-217. My discussion of the Protestant Reformation has focused mainly on the theological differ-
ences among the reformers and the Roman Catholic Church that when combined with the pre-modern
paradigm made it difficult to avoid religiously-based conflict for control of the state. However, in his
article for this symposium, Robin Lovin has persuasively argued that "normative religious pluralism" in
the West resulted from a "rethinking of politics originated in the Protestant Reformation, so that the
necessary political arrangements for the emergence of normative religious pluralism were themselves
grounded in religious thought about political life." Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27
Miss. C. L. REV.89, 101(2008).
82. TOULMIN, supra note 76, at 81.
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who are too often ignored, constituted the first beginning. He character-
izes the humanists as embracing a more modest understanding of reason
(thought and conduct must be reasonable rather than certain) that is more
tolerant of "social, cultural, and intellectual diversity."83 The seventeenth
century rationalists constituted the second beginning of the Enlightenment
as a "Quest for Certainty." Contrary to conventional accounts of rational-
ists as engaged in pure abstract thought, Toulmin maintains that the ration-
alist theories of 17th-century philosophers were "a timely response to a
specific historical challenge-the political, social, and theological chaos em-
bodied in the Thirty Years' War."84 For example, Ren6 Descartes gave up
on the modest skepticism of the 16th century humanists and attempted to
provide "clear, distinct, and certain" foundations for knowledge that pro-
vided "a new way of establishing ... central truths and ideas: one that was
independent of, and neutral between, particular religious loyalties."85 Sim-
ilarly, Grotius "reorganized the general rules of practical law into a system
whose principles were the counterparts of Euclid's axioms" and in the Le-
viathan, Thomas Hobbes tried to establish political theory on principles es-
tablished with the same kind of geometrical certainty.
8 6
From the perspective of the second beginning of Modernity, the mod-
ern paradigm can be seen both as a reaction to the religious pluralism fol-
lowing Protestant Reformation and an attempt to find an alternative
unitary foundation for law based on an Enlightenment conception of rea-
son. In this respect, political philosopher Charles Taylor has argued that
"[t]he origin point of modern Western secularism was the wars of religion;
or rather, the search in battle-fatigue and horror for a way out of them.
The need was felt for a ground of coexistence for Christians of different
confessional persuasions."87 Taylor argues that this required that the pub-
lic domain "be regulated by certain norms or agreements which were inde-
pendent of confessional allegiance, and could in some way be ensured
against overturn in the name of such allegiances."88 In Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement, political philosopher John Rawls also highlights that "one
historical origin of liberalism is the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries following the Reformation" and notes that Hobbes's
Leviathan (1652)-surely the greatest work of political philosophy in En-
glish-is concerned with the problem of order during the turmoil of the
English civil war; and so also is Locke's Second Treatise (also 1689). "89
With respect to the origin of modern international law, David Ken-
nedy maintains that the current ideas about public international law have
83. Id. at 199.
84. Id. at 70.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 76-77.
87. TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 32. But cf. John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions About the History of
Separation of Church and State, 48 J. CHURCH AND STATE 15, 16-17 (2006) (arguing with respect to the
historical debates about the separation of church and state that "separationism is an ancient Western
teaching rooted in the Bible" including roots in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament).
88. TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 32.
89. JOHN RAWLs, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 1 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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similarly evolved from a Westphalian account.9" Although challenging this
account and exaggerating its claims somewhat, he comments that
[i]nternational legal scholars are particularly insistent that
their discipline began in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia
closing the Thirty Years' War. The originality of 1648 is im-
portant to the discipline, for it situates public international
law as rational philosophy, handmaiden of statehood, the
cultural heir to religious principle. . . . Before 1648 were
facts, politics, religion, in some tellings a "chaotic void"
slowly filled by sovereign states. Thereafter, after the estab-
lishment of peace, after the "rise of states," after the col-
lapse of "religious universalism," after the chaos of war,
came law - as philosophy, as idea, as word.91
Kennedy pejoratively suggests that from its inception, the idea of in-
ternational law has been associated with a movement beyond "the inade-
quacies of religion" (i.e., religion produces war not peace) to a rational
notion of law to govern the relations among the evolving nation-states. 92
In this account, religion is "something we used to have" which "begins as a
social force, is transformed into a 'philosophy' [natural law theory] and sur-
vives only as a set of 'principles,' guiding the practice of institutions." 93 By
the end of the traditional period (1648-1918), these principles are no longer
legitimated by natural law but by a positivist account of sovereign con-
sent.94 Subsequently, in the modern era, the focus has shifted to the prag-
matic application of doctrinal principles and the international institutions
that make this possible. Moreover, Kennedy charges that this problematic
account of international law maintains that international law, in a sense,
takes the place of religion with an "essentially ecumenical and anti-impe-
rial" universality. 95
90. David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 12-28
(1988).
91. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Kennedy maintains that the "goal in this historical work has been
to unsettle the confidence of twentieth century international law in its ability to transcend and supplant
the difficulties and contradictions of philosophy through pragmatic and functional structures." Id. at 28.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 18, 19.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 23. This account is not to suggest that others do not argue for an essential relationship
between international law and religion. See, e.g., John D. Carlson & Erik C. Owens, Reconsidering
Westphalia's Legacy for Religion and International Politics, in THE SACRED AND THE SOVEREIGN: RE-
LIGION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (John D. Carlson & Erik C. Owens eds., 2003) (introduction
for chapters reevaluating the relationship between religion and national sovereignty, international law,
and human rights); RICHARD FALK, RELIGION AND HUMANE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 11 (2001) (begins
exploring "a form of reconstructive postmodernism [theory of international relations], that is, a post-
Westphalian perspective that is informed by ethical values and spiritual belief")(emphasis in original);
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds. 1999); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 29 (1998) (arguing that "if-the conviction that every
human being is sacred is inescapably religious, it follows that the idea of human rights is ineliminably
religious, because the conviction is an essential, even foundational, constituent of the idea"); THE IN-
FLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark W. Janis ed. 1991);
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If we extrapolate from Kennedy's comments to the modern para-
digm's account of law in general, a series of unanswered questions arises.
Can law take the place of religion? Should law provide a secular compre-
hensive conviction about authentic human existence? Is secularism a kind
of religion? Can law do without religion? What needs to be assumed
about law for it to be kept separate from religion? Must law have one
source of legitimation? To address these questions, Section III will set forth
a definition of religion, religious pluralism, and the secularization of law.
III. RELIGION, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, AND THE SECULARIZATION
OF LAW
More specifically, Section III will explore how the contemporary con-
ceptions of religion have roots in the seventeenth century as an attempt to
deal with the wars of religion and how conceptions of religion have further
expanded to deal with the growth of religious pluralism in the West beyond
pluralism within the Christian tradition. Furthermore, it will summarize
the concept of the secularization of society and its relevance for legitimat-
ing law under the modern paradigm.
A. Defining Religion
The discussion of the Protestant Reformation helped demonstrate the
comprehensive nature of religious convictions.96 Even within Christianity,
theological differences resulted in dramatic differences of how to under-
stand the requirements of the Christian life and whether the state could be
held to Christian standards. These theological differences helped fuel the
wars of religion that ravaged Europe and England in the seventeenth cen-
tury. Partly in response to these religious wars, Wilfred Cantwell Smith
notes that scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries began de-
veloping the concept of religion as something with generic characteristics
which many religions exhibit.97 He also claims that the use of the term
religion underwent a shift at about this time:
some Renascence humanists and then some Protestant Re-
formers adopted a concept religion to represent an inner
piety; but that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
turies this was largely superseded by a concept of schematic
Richard Ashcraft, Religion and Lockean Natural Rights, in Religious Diversity and Human Rights 195,
196 (Irene Bloom, et al. eds. 1996)(arguing that John Locke rejected the common Western assumption
(which is often attributed to him) that "in any general discussion of individual rights" that "religion is
one of the least important explanatory factors to be considered.").
96. Parts A and B relating to defining religion and religious pluralism summary are taken in part
from a longer account of the nature of religion in the context of judicial decision making. See Modak-
Truran, Reenchanting the Law, supra note 9, at 721-28, 799-806.
97. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION: A NEW APPROACH TO
THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF MANKIND 43 (1962) (emphasizing that this generic concept of religion
"is a concept primarily formulated and used by men who are weary of the clash or suspicious of the
whole enterprise.").
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externalization that reflected, and served, the clash of con-
flicting religious parties, the emergence of a triumphant in-
tellectualism, and the emerging new information from
beyond the seas about the patterns of other men's religious
life. These provided the foundations of the concept for the
modern world.9"
This shift had several important consequences. First, it helped move
beyond the pejorative use of the term religion as a label to distinguish "reli-
gions" (i.e., a false faith) from your personal piety or true faith.99 Prior to
this change, the term "faith" was used as a positive reference to one's own
personal piety while others with different beliefs merely had "religion". In
addition, it allowed reference to "a generic 'religion' . . . as an external
entity the total system or sum of all systems of beliefs, or simply the gener-
alization that they are there." 10 This facilitated referring to all faiths by
the plural "religions" so that no particular religion had a prima facie pref-
erence to other religions. As noted in Part B, this generic classification is
crucial to the notion of religious pluralism presupposed by the modern
paradigm.
Finally, this shift in usage meant that "religion is something that one
believes or does not believe, something whose propositions are true or are
not true, something whose locus is in the realm of the intelligible, is up for
inspection by the speculative mind."1 1 As discussed in this Part below,
treating religion as a set of beliefs meant that religion had both a subjective
side (i.e., whether one believes) and an objective side (i.e., what one be-
lieves). In Part C, the modern paradigm and its understanding of seculari-
zation of the law will be shown to further assume that science is objectively
true while religion is only subjectively true. This epistemological claim and
the recognition of the subjective and objective sides of religion facilitate
regulating religion to the private or subjective realm in the modern
paradigm.
While not sufficiently taken into account in the modern paradigm, the
academic understanding of religion has advanced considerably since these
first attempts to define religion. Rather than assuming that everyone
knows what counts as "religion," the academic study of religion proceeds
by various methods of analyzing religion. Religion scholar John Hick
maintains that "[r]eligion is one thing to the anthropologist, another to the
sociologist, another to the psychologist," another to the theologian, and
another to the philosopher." 2 This results, in part, from the different pur-
poses of the many types of inquiries that analyze the nature of religion
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id. at 42-43.
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id. at 40.
102. JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973).
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including the anthropology of religion, a°3 sociology of religion," psychol-
ogy of religion,105 history of religions,1 °6 theology,0 7 and philosophy of re-
ligion. For example, sociology of religion views religion "in terms of social
interaction" and studies religion "with reference to the general concepts of
103. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 87-141 (1973). Geertz de-
fines a religion as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence
and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic." Id. at 90. While Geertz's definition has continued to be quite influential,
scholars continue to debate its merits. See, e.g., Kevin Schilbrack, Religion, Models of, and Reality: Are
We Through with Geertz?, 73 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 429 (2005) (responding to two criticisms of
Geertz's project and despite partial merit of criticisms, arguing that Geertz's approach is legitimate and
fruitful).
104. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph
Ward Swain trans., 1915). Durkheim comments that "religion is something eminently social. Religious
representations are collective representations which express collective realities." Id. at 22. More spe-
cifically, he proposes a famous definition of religion as:
[A] unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set
apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community
called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element, which thus finds a place
in our definition, is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is
inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently
collective thing.
Id. at 62-63; see also PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THE-
ORY OF RELIGION (1967).
105. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN
NATURE (1982) (Martin E. Marty ed.). James states that religion "shall mean for us the feelings, acts,
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in
relation to whatever they may consider the divine." Id. at 31; see also Don Browning, Can Psychology
Escape Religion? Should It?, 7 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. RELIGION 1, 3 (1997). Browning defines religion as "a
narrative or metaphorical representation of the ultimate context of reality and its associated worldview,
rituals, and ethics ... Furthermore, the concept of religion assumes that the narratives, worldviews,
rituals, and ethics are held and celebrated by some identifiable community." Id.
106. See, e.g., MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION (Wil-
lard R. Task trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich & World, Inc. 1959). Eliade argues "that sacred and
profane are two modes of being in the world, two existential situations assumed by man in the course of
his history" and notes that his chief concern is "to show in what ways religious man attempts to remain
as long as possible in a sacred universe, and hence what his total experience of life proves to be in
comparison with the experience of the man without religious feeling, of the man who lives, or wishes to
live, in a desacralized world." Id. at 13, 14. He further emphasizes that "the completely profane world,
the wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the history of the human spirit." Id. at 13.
107. See, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, 1 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1951). Paul Tillich defines religion in
terms of the concept of ultimate concern. Id. at 11-12. He states:
The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it
makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any condi-
tions of character, desire, or circumstance. The unconditional concern is total: no part of our-
selves or of our world is excluded from it; there is no 'place' to flee from it. The total concern
is infinite: no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which
is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite.
Id. See also DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 84 (1987).
For Tracy, "religions are exercises in resistance. Whether seen as Utopian visions or believed in as
revelations of Ultimate Reality, the religions reveal various possibilities for human freedom that are not
intended for that curious distancing act that has become second nature to our aesthetic sensibilities."
Id. He further claims that religious questions are "limit questions" which "must be logically odd ques-
tions, since they are questions about the most fundamental presuppositions, the most basic beliefs, of all
our knowing, willing, and acting." Id. at 86, 87.
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sociology, including leadership, stratification, and socialization.' 0 De-
spite these advances, no generally accepted definition of religion exists and
probably never will exist. 0 9
For the purposes of this article, however, the central concern is to un-
derstand the role of religious convictions or claims in legitimating the law.
The primary concern is with the kind of claims religion makes and how
religious claims are related to other types of claims such as legal and moral
claims. In contrast to the other approaches to understanding religion, the
philosophy of religion has typically focused on these questions. Therefore,
I will adopt the philosophy of religion approach taken by Schubert Ogden
and define religion in such a way as to outline the relationship between
religious claims and legal and moral claims.
Regarding the definition of religion, Ogden defines religion as "the
primary form of culture in terms of which we human beings explicitly ask
and answer the existential question of the meaning of ultimate reality for
us."110 According to this account, religion explicitly asks what is "authentic
human existence" or "how we are to understand ourselves and others in
relation to the whole"."' The existential question, the question of mean-
ing, is the question which is presupposed by all other questions. It is the
comprehensive question concerning "what is the valid comprehensive self-
understanding" or "comprehensive human purpose"." 2 Religion explicitly
answers the existential or comprehensive question by providing the "con-
cepts and symbols whose express function is to mediate authentic self-un-
derstanding."' 13  In other words, religion includes a comprehensive
108. GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A MODERN DICTIONARY OF SOCI-
OLOGY 406 (1969).
109. Cf. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 454 (1998) (pointing
out the difficulties of defining religion and identifying that "the goal of religious studies in the aca-
demic, legal, and political context, as well as in a scholarly setting, is to develop a common discourse
about religion and religious difference.").
110. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE MANY? 5
(1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE].
111. Id. at 6. In more technical terms, the existential or religious question involves a metaphysical
aspect and an ethical aspect that are closely related. In its metaphysical aspect, "it asks about the
ultimate reality of our own existence in relation to others and the whole." Id. at 17. Unlike metaphys-
ics proper, which determines the structure of ultimate reality itself, the metaphysical aspect of religion
tells us the meaning of ultimate reality for us. In addition, in its ethical aspect, religion "asks about our
authentic self-understanding." Id. at 18. Here again, there is a difference between ethics proper, which
asks how we are to act, and the ethical aspect of religion, which tells us how we are to understand
ourselves. Moreover, each specific religion answers both the metaphysical and ethical aspects of the
existential question.
112. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 22-23 (1995). Gamwell further recognizes that his "definition and discus-
sion of religion is nothing other than an attempt to appropriate [Ogden's] formulations for the purposes
of the present inquiry." Id. at 15 n.1. Cf Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and The De Facto Disestab-
lishment, 81 MARO. L. REV. 203, 216 (1998)(claiming that "what we call 'religion' typically amounts to a
comprehensive way of perceiving and understanding life and the world; it affects everything") (empha-
sis added).
113. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 8.
[VOL. 27:159
2007] BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I) 181
evaluation of human activity in terms of the nature of existence to deter-
mine "how human activity as such ought to make a difference to the larger
reality of which it is a part.
114
If the existential or comprehensive question is presupposed by all
other questions, does that mean that answering any question (such as
which party should win a law suit) presupposes an answer to the existential
question? Yes and no. Ogden argues that "everything that we think, say,
or do, insofar, at least, as it makes or implies a claim to validity, necessarily
presupposes that ultimate reality is such as to authorize some understand-
ing of ourselves as authentic and that, conversely, some understanding of
our existence is authentic because it is authorized by ultimate reality. '115
Consequently, in a sense, answering any question implies an understanding
of what constitutes authentic human existence or an answer to the compre-
hensive or existential question. However, Franklin Gamwell notes that this
does not mean that all human activity is religious but that "the character of
human activity as such implies the possibility of religion, in the sense that it
implies the comprehensive question and, therefore, the possibility that this
question is asked and answered explicitly."' 6 Human activity is thus relig-
ious only to the extent that the existential or comprehensive question has
been explicitly asked and answered.
To differentiate between explicitly answering and implicitly "answer-
ing" the comprehensive question, Ogden refers to the former as religion
and the latter as a "basic faith in the meaning of life."'1 17 Ogden argues that
this basic faith is presupposed by all human activity. It involves "accepting
the larger setting of one's life and adjusting oneself to it.""' 8 It implicitly
answers the existential or comprehensive question because it involves a
self-conscious adjustment to these conditions." 9 Unlike other animals,
human animals not only "live by faith" but "seek understanding."120
Humans are "instinct poor"; "[n]ot only the details of our lives but even
their overall pattern as authentically human remain undecided by our
membership in the human species and are left to our own freedom and
responsibility to decide."'21 In other words, humans do not live by merely
accepting their setting and adjusting to it (basic faith); they seek a reflective
self-understanding of reality (the whole) and their place in it (authentic
human existence). Religion provides the concepts and symbols for human
114. GAMWELL, supra note 112, at 25.
115. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 7.
116. GAMWELL, supra note 112, at 23 n.5.
117. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 18.
118. SHUBERT M. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY 70 (1986).
119. For clarity, it should be noted that Ogden argues that both basic faith and religion involve
understanding and faith. However, basic faith is not reflective while religion is reflective. In terms
slightly different to those used here, he distinguishes between "the existential understanding or faith
[basic faith] that is constitutive of human existence as such and the reflective understanding or faith
[religion] whereby what is presented existentially can be re-presented in an express, thematic, and con-
ceptually precise way." Id. at 71.
120. Id. at 106.
121. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 6.
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reflective self-understanding; it attempts to make sense "of our basic faith
in the meaning of life, given the facts of life as we actually experience it."'
1 22
To the extent that humans act with reflective self-understanding or have an
explicit comprehensive understanding of authentic human existence, they
are religious. Consequently, for the purposes of this discussion, "religion"
will be equated with an explicit "comprehensive claim or conviction about
human authenticity."
Accordingly, religion not only includes the recognized world religions
of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but it also in-
cludes humanism, capitalism (when proposed as a normative rather than as
a positive theory), 123 communism, and other so-called secular answers to
the existential question. This means that there is and always has been a
plurality of religions or comprehensive self-understandings. As a result, all
human activity (including legal interpretation) is either explicitly informed
by a plurality of religious convictions or implicitly informed by a basic faith
in the meaningfulness of existence.
Schubert Ogden also maintains that reason plays an essential role in
the articulation and evaluation of religious convictions. 124 He rejects two
122. Id. at 18.
123. See David R. Loy, The Religion of the Market, 65 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 275 (1997). After
adopting a functionalist view of religion "as what grounds us by teaching us what the world is, and what
our role in the world is," Loy argues that "our present economic system should also be understood as
our religion, because it has come to fulfill a religious function for us. The discipline of economics is less
a science than the theology of that religion, and its god, the Market, has become a vicious circle of ever-
increasing production and consumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation. The collapse of
communism-best understood as a capitalist 'heresy'-makes it more apparent that the Market is be-
coming the first truly world religion, binding all corners of the globe more and more tightly into a
worldview and set of values whose religious role we overlook only because we insist on seeing them as
'secular."' Id.
124. Despite the common assumption that religion is nonrational, many theologians and philoso-
phers have argued that religious convictions depend, at least in part, on rational reflection for their
articulation and evaluation. This does not mean that they have agreed upon the definition of reason, its
role in critical reflection, or its priority with respect to revelation. Differences about these issues should
not take away from the important role reason has played in formulating and critiquing religious convic-
tions. For example, reason has been central to systematic theology and philosophical theology even
though there has not been agreement on how the role of reason should be defined. At one extreme,
Immanuel Kant argues that philosophical theology depends on pure reason to understand the possibil-
ity and the attributes of the concept of God. IMMANUEL KANT, LECUruRES ON PHILOSOPHICAL THEOL-
OGY (Allen W. Wood & Gertrude M. Clark trans., 1978). At the other extreme, Paul Tillich claims that
reason alone cannot give answers to the ultimate questions about life because in the existential situa-
tion, reason contradicts itself. PAUL TILLICH, 1 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 18-28 (1951). Philosophy helps
analyze the existential situation in which we live, but "[r]evelation is the answer to the questions im-
plied in the existential conflicts of reason." Id. at 147. Somewhere in between, David Tracy maintains
that "contemporary Christian theology is best understood as philosophical reflection upon the mean-
ings present in common human experience and the meanings present in the Christian tradition."
DAVID TRACY, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: THE NEW PLURALISM IN THEOLOGY 34 (1975). Although
these approaches incorporate philosophy (reason) into theology in different ways, they all support the
necessary role of reason for theological reflection about religious convictions. Religious convictions are
not exempt from critical reflection; they are the product of critical reflection. This is not to say that
other theologians have not deemphasized or minimized the role of reason in theological reflection. See,
e.g., 1 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 35-37 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis
Battles trans., 1960) (arguing that religious arguments based on revelation are more reliable because
human reason is corrupted by sin (self-deception)). Rather, it is to emphasize that there are numerous
theologians and philosophers who have embraced reason as a central part of the theological task of
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common assumptions about theology that preclude critical reflection on re-
ligious convictions: "(1) that theology as such has to appeal to special crite-
ria of truth for some if not all of its assertions; and (2) that the theologian
as such has to be a believer already committed to the truth of the assertions
that theological reflection seeks to establish." '125 To the contrary, he argues
that religious convictions are subject to critical validation. Religious con-
victions are different in the sense that they are comprehensive but that
does not mean they are beyond critical or rational validation. In fact, he
maintains that "it is the very nature of a religion to make or imply the claim
to formal religious truth."'2 6 In other words, religious convictions, like any




Given that religious convictions can be critically validated, Ogden
could be read to suggest that there is only one true religion that can be
arrived at by critical reflection. If this were the case, the state could estab-
lish this religion as the official legitimation of the law and the state. To the
contrary, Ogden maintains that the debate about religious pluralism has
been mistaken because it has proceeded from the assumption that there is
either one true religion (monism) or that there are many equally true reli-
gions (pluralism). He argues that religious monism comes in two varieties:
exclusivism and inclusivism. For example, in its Christian form, exclusivists
claim that there is "no salvation outside of the Church" or "no salvation
outside of Christianity. 1 2 8 By contrast, Christian inclusivists argue that
[Tihe possibility of salvation uniquely constituted by the
event of Jesus Christ is somehow made available to each
and every human being without exception [usually through
the fragmentary explication of the true religion (Christian-
ity) by other religions] and, therefore, is exclusive of no one
unless she or he excludes her- or himself from its effect by a
free and responsible decision to reject it.'
2 9
The alternative usually proposed to these two forms of monism is plu-
ralism. Pluralists maintain "not only that there can be many true religions
but there actually are."'3 ° On this account, all religions are equally true,
articulating and evaluating religious convictions. These positions thus further support the assumption
that religious convictions are rational and subject to critical reflection.
125. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 118, at 103.
126. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 13.
127. For further elaboration on Ogden's arguments, see Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law,
supra note 9, at 799-805.
128. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 110, at 28-29.
129. Id. at 31.
130. Id. at 27.
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and one religion cannot be shown to be true and another false. The mod-
ern paradigm appears to assume pluralism in this sense. Treating religious
convictions as equally true (or equally false) means that they can be rele-
gated to the private or subjective realm which is consistent with the con-
ventional understanding of secularizing the law. As noted by Max Weber
in Part C, the modern paradigm and its understanding of secularization of
the law seem to further assume that science is objectively true so that sci-
ence rather than religion should be used to find an objective foundation for
the law. The problematic nature of this hidden assumption will become
more pronounced in the discussion in Section IV of the ontological gap
between the practice of law, which presupposes a religious ontology, and
legal theory under the modern paradigm, which presupposes a scientific
ontology (i.e., scientific materialism).
Conversely, Ogden contends that religious convictions are capable of
critical validation. Some religious convictions are capable of critical valida-
tion by theology and philosophy and others are not. This seems to suggest
religious monism, but Ogden argues for another option, which he calls
"pluralistic inclusivism." 13 1 He maintains that the logical contradictory to
religious monism "is not that there actually are many true religions, but
only that there can be." '132 In other words, more than one religion may be
capable of critical validation. More than one religion may be the true re-
flective understanding of our basic existential faith.
Also, as a product of critical reflection, religious convictions can be
modified and corrected based on further reflection and based on what is
learned from dialogue with other religions. The pursuit of religious truth is
never complete. Through ongoing reflection and encounters with other re-
ligions, the possibility for improvement is ever present. Consequently,
even if a religion could be shown to be more true than others, Ogden
would oppose the establishment of an official religion. Establishing an offi-
cial religion would cut off the opportunity for further improvement and
refinement of religious truth. It would stifle the pursuit of religious truth
and jeopardize further progress from subsequent rational reflection and di-
alogue among those holding a plurality of religious convictions.
Ogden's account of religion and religious pluralism illuminates the dis-
cussion of paradigms of law and religion is several ways. First, Ogden's
definition clarifies why the pre-modern paradigm resulted in so much con-
flict after the Protestant Reformation. The pre-modern paradigm only al-
lows for one of the post-Reformation Christian confessions to legitimate
the law and the state. However, from the stand point of religious minori-
ties, the official or established religion does not legitimate the law or the
state. Each person's religion constitutes the comprehensive condition of
validity for all normative claims including claims about the legitimacy of
the law and the state. As noted in Section II, the substantial theological
131. See id. at x-xi.
132. Id. at 83.
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differences among Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anabap-
tists also meant that those in the religious minority were often subject to
coercive efforts by rulers to impose their religious affiliation on them.
Under the pre-modern paradigm, conflict between the state and minority
religious groups appears ineviable because they reject the official religious
legitimation of the ruler and its law but are coerced to accept it.
In addition, Ogden's account challenges the conventional distinction
between what is considered secular and what is considered religious.
Breaking down this distinction potentially calls into question the claimed
neutrality of the modern paradigm among religions based on its alleged
secular foundation for law. If the secular foundation constitutes a compre-
hensive conviction about authentic human existence, then the foundation is
religious rather than "secular". Rather than remaining neutral to other re-
ligions, the "secular" foundation competes and conflicts with a plurality of
religions. For example, Section VI will argue that the French doctrine of
lait necessitates secular solidarity (i.e., secularism), which constitutes a
comprehensive conviction about authetic human existence. This explains
the current heated conflict in France between the state-sponsored secular-
ism that precludes Muslim girls from wearing headscarves in school and
interpretations of Islam that require Muslim girls to wear headscares in
school. Furthermore, Section V will argue that John Rawls's and Jirgen
Habermas's liberal versions of the modern paradigm depend upon a hid-
den comprehensive doctrine that is not religiously neutral and that leads to
self-contradiction. Consequently, I will conclude that the modern para-
digm is closer to the pre-modern paradigm than most scholars have recog-
nized because it continues a unitary religious legitimation of law by other
means.
C. The Secularization of the Law
While currently being reevaluated, the theory of secularization has
been part of sociology since the post-Enlightenment origins of the disci-
pline. The work in sociology of religion by Max Weber and tmile Durk-
heim, two of the founders of modern sociology, provided the "foundations
for the more systematic formulations of the theory of secularization." '133
Sociologist Jos6 Casanova identifies "the core and central thesis of the the-
ory of secularization" as "the conceptualization of the process of societal
modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation
of the secular spheres-primarily the state, the economy, and science-
from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and speciali-
zation of religion within its own newly found religious sphere."' 34 In addi-
tion to the general conception, secularization may also refer to the actual
historical processes of secularization in a particular society or the antici-
pated consequences of those processes on religion.
133. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 3, at 17.
134. Id. at 19.
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Casanova further notes that it reached "a truly paradigmatic status
within the modern social sciences" without really being supported empiri-
cally. 135 In fact, he argues that "the theory of secularization is so intrinsi-
cally interwoven with all the theories of the modern world and with the
self-understanding of modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory
of secularization without putting into question the entire web, including
much of the self-understanding of the social sciences." '136 In the 1960s, the
theory began to receive "more systematic and empirically grounded formu-
lations of the theory of secularization," but by the 1980s, criticism began
mounting because of the increasing public role of religion.'37 While Casa-
nova still thinks the core of the theory is defensible with some revisions, a
large group of American sociologists like Peter Berger have concluded "a
whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled
'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken." '138
One of the difficulties in sorting out this debate has to do with the
different uses of the term secularization. Casanova has argued that the the-
ory of secularization is better understood as having three different connota-
tions. First, its most widespread current usage is to refer to the "decline of
religious beliefs and practices in modern societies." '39 Second, seculariza-
tion is often understood as the "privatization of religion.., both as a gen-
eral modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a
precondition for modern liberal democratic politics."14 Finally, "the core
component of classic theories of secularization" is the claim that seculariza-
tion entails the "differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, sci-
ence) usually understood as an 'emancipation' from religious institutions
and norms."' 41
With respect to the modern paradigm, the first two types of seculariza-
tion, which have been widely criticized, are not as relevant as the third type
of secularization as a differentiation of law from religion and morality. 4
This process of differentiation raises several important issues for the mod-
ern paradigm. Does the institutional separation of the law from religious
institutions mean that religious norms and the law are autonomous or sepa-
rate spheres? What provides the legitimation of law without religion and
morality? Is law reduced to power or privilege? Does the secularization of
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in The Deseculariza-
tion of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics 2 (Peter L. Berger ed. 1999).
139. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization, supra note 3, at 7.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The third type of secularization (differentiation of secular spheres) may overlap to some
extent with the second type in the sense that the "privatization of religion" is sometimes assumed to be
a "normative condition modern liberal democratic politics." Given that Weber and Habermas focus on
the third type without noting this potential overlap, I will not distinguish these two types but take them
as related theses supporting both descriptive and normative claims about the secularization of law.
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law mean that the legitimation of law is independent of religion? Can law
have both a secular and religious legitimation?
Max Weber's account of secularization or rationalization of society
and its consequences for the legitimation of law addresses many of these
questions from the perspecitve of the modern paradigm. Weber's theory of
rationalization includes a very elaborate typology of the different ideal
types of rationality (e.g., subjective, objective, objectified, conceptual, in-
strumental, substantive, and formal) that he finds in Western culture.
143
For the purposes of this Article, it will serve to offer a general understand-
ing of Weber's theory and how it raises questions about the legitimation
and application of law.
14 4
According to Weber, Western culture is characterized by a "specific
and peculiar rationalism" 145 that has resulted in the "disenchantment of the
world.' 46 Before disenchantment, religious and metaphysical worldviews
gave comprehensive explanations of the whole of life; life was not yet dif-
ferentiated into spheres. 147 Science, the only form of objective knowledge,
then showed that religious and metaphysical worldviews could not provide
an "objectively" rational explanation of the world.148 "Every increase of
rationalism in empirical science," Weber maintains, "increasingly pushe[d]
religion from the rational into the irrational realm."'1 49 For Weber, science
and scientific (instrumental or means/end) rationality are normative be-
cause they comprise "the only possible form of a reasoned view of the
world."' 50 "For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the
truth."'' Moreover, science discloses to us that the world process is a
"meaningless infinity . . . on which human beings confer meaning and
significance.'
' 52
Accordingly, Weber claims that modern individuals (who are pre-
sumed to embrace scientific rationality) are faced with the knowledge of an
absolute division between objectively rational facts and subjectively ra-
tional values.'5 3 All values are subjective and are only subjectively valid.'
54
143. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 292-301 (H. H. Gerth and C. W.
Mills trans. & eds., 1958) [hereinafter WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER].
144. For a more detailed treatment of Weber's social theory and legal positivism (from which the
discussions in Sections I and III are partially drawn), see Mark C. Modak-Truran, Secularization, Legal
Indeterminacy, and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 73, 79-84 (2007), and
Mark Modak-Truran, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law and the Relationship Between Law and
Religion, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 461, 464-72 (1997).
145. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 26 (Talcott Parsons
trans., 1958) [hereinafter WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC].
146. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 143 at 155, 350.
147. Id. at 154-55.
148. Id. at 350-51.
149. Id. at 351.
150. Id. at 355.
151. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 84 (Edward A. Shils & Henry
A. Finch trans. & eds., 1949) [hereinafter WEBER, METHODOLOGY].
152. Id. at 81.
153. Id. at 18-19, 52-53.
154. Id. at 51-53, 83.
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Although objective scientific rationality can determine the technically cor-
rect means to a given end, it cannot determine the correct value-orienta-
tion.155 Weber maintains that "the choice between 'God' and the 'Devil"'
and "every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole ... is a
series of ultimate decisions through which the soul-as in Plato-chooses
its own fate, i.e., the meaning of its activity and existence."' 56 Value-orien-
tations (traditional, affectional, value-rational, and instrumental) are based
on an irrational, arbitrary, and criterionless choice. 157 "There is no (rational
or empirical) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can pro-
vide us with a decision here."' 58 Science can make objectively rational
judgments for only a narrow range of technical problems where the end is
precisely given and the only decision concerns choosing the most rational
means.159 Consequently, scientific rationality, the most distinctive type of
rationality defining Western culture, cannot solve the most important indi-
vidual and social problems concerning what ends or values to pursue. 6 °
The "specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture" has further
resulted in the differentiation of society into numerous spheres of life or
objectified forms of rationality including industrial capitalism, formalistic
law, and bureaucratic administration. 16 These objectified forms of ration-
ality have become embodied or institutionalized in the social order and
confront individuals as something external. For example, the objectified ra-
tionality of industrial capitalism has "become an iron cage" or "an im-
mense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself
... as an unalterable order of things in which he must live.' 1 62 One of the
leading principles of capitalism, the Protestant Ethic, requires "the earning
of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all sponta-
neous enjoyment of life."' 163 In the world of "economic survival of the fit-
test," violating this principle results in being "eliminated from the
economic scene.' 1 64 Likewise, modern bureaucratic organization consti-
tutes an "'escape-proof"' "inanimate machine" that "is busy fabricating
155. Id. at 18-19, 34-35.
156. Id. at 18.
157. Id. at 18-19; WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 143, at 152.
158. WEBER, METHODOLOGY, supra note 151, at 19.
159. Id. at 18-19, 52-53.
160. For Habermas's and other Frankfurt School thinkers' critiques of instrumental reason, see 1
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION
OF SOCIETY 366-99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNI-
CATIVE ACTION].
161. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 145, at 26. Weber's use of the term "objective
rationality" is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as meaning both objectively correct action and as supra-
individual or institutionalized rationality. Thus, I have used the term "objectified" to denote "objectiv-
ity" in the institutionalized sense. In addition, please note that Habermas refers to Weber's "spheres of
life" both as spheres, 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 160, at 244-71,
and as "cultural subsystems." Id. at 72. I will use the term "spheres of life" or "spheres" to promote
continuity with the discussion of Weber.
162. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 145, at 181, 54.
163. Id. at 53.
164. Id. at 55.
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the shell of bondage which men will perhaps be forced to inhabit some
day.
165
Moreover, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber
observes that "[t]here is, for example, rationalization of mystical contem-
plation, that is of an attitude which, viewed from other departments of life,
is specifically irrational, just as much as there are rationalizations of eco-
nomic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military training, of law
and administration." '66 He clarifies that "each one of these fields may be
rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is
rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another.'
67
The rationalization of society has thus affected all areas of culture result-
ing in a variety of differentiated fields (i.e., "spheres of life"). He further
concludes that the rationalization of society includes a multiplicity of his-
torical processes of rationalization (both internal and external to the
spheres) that are proceeding at different rates and that are furthering dif-
ferent ends and values.
The rationalization of Western culture has also affected the bases of
legitimation within these differentiated "spheres of life," including law.
Weber recognizes four basic types of legitimation: (1) traditional; (2) affec-
tual (emotional) faith; (3) value-rational (including ethical); and (4) legal
(positive enactment).'68 Rationalization, however, has minimized the first
three types. "Today," Weber claims, "the most common form of legitimacy
is the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally
correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner. '169 In other
words, legality under Weber's understanding of the modern paradigm is
that which is produced from following the recognized procedures constitut-
ing positive enactment; no substantive criteria of justice must be met.
Legality, in this sense, constitutes legitimacy either because "it derives
from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties" or because "it is im-
posed by an authority which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets
with compliance. '"170 The distinction between legitimacy by voluntary
agreement and by the imposition of authority is relative. For example, in
majoritarian democracies, the majority often imposes its agreement on the
dissenting minority. 171 In addition, legality-whether democratically deter-
mined or not-can be reduced to compliance with the procedures believed
to be legitimate in the existing regime.17 z In a rationalized society, many
spheres of life-economic, bureaucratic, and legal-will be legitimized by
165. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1401, 1402 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) [hereinafter 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY].
166. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 145, at 26.
167. Id.
168. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 36 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
169. Id. at 37.
170. Id. at 36.
171. Id. at 37.
172. Jirgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 219
(Sterling M. McMurrin ed., Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988) [hereinafter Habermas, Law and Morality].
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legality because the other bases of legitimation, whether value-rational
(moral, religious, metaphysical), traditional, or emotional, have been sub-
stantially diminished by the rationalization or secularization of society.
As noted above in Part B, Weber's understanding of the modern para-
digm results in the complete separation of law and religion. Religion
makes only subjectively rational claims and has been relegated to the pri-
vate or subjective realm by the secularization of society. Once religious
and metaphysical world views have been eliminated as a justification for
law, law must have its own independent, rational justification. Thus, under
the modern paradigm, the law is autonomous from religion.
IV. Two CRISES FOR THE MODERN PARADIGM: LEGAL
INDETERMINACY AND THE ONTOLOGICAL GAP
Positing paradigms of law and religion as a useful tool for identifying
the key assumptions relating to the legitimation of law should not be taken
to suggest that identifying and evaluating paradigms of law and religion is
obvious or straight forward. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Thomas S. Kuhn emphasizes the difficulty of analyzing paradigms because
they constitute the "criterion for choosing problems that, while the para-
digm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions."' 73 Kuhn fur-
ther argues that a paradigm is "like an accepted judicial decision in the
common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under
new or more stringent conditions."' 74 This taken for granted nature of par-
adigms makes them difficult to analyze and resistant to change. Kuhn
stresses that paradigms can "even insulate the community from those so-
cially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, be-
cause they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental
tools the paradigm supplies."' 5 These paradigms constitute "incommensu-
rable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it."' 76
For example, notwithstanding Moore's homily noted in the introduc-
tion, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary reaffirmed the modern paradigm
by unanimously removing Moore as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court because he "not only willfully and publicly defied the orders of a
United States district court" to remove the Ten Commandments monu-
ment but also indicated that in the future "he would do the same.' 77
Moore failed to convert his fellow judges to the pre-modern paradigm and
thereby establish the Judeo-Christian God as the final authority under Ala-
bama law. In other words, from inside the modern paradigm, Former Chief
Justice Moore's position cannot challenge the secular foundation of law but
must be classified as an Establishment Clause violation. Law locates and
173. Kuhn, supra note 1, at 37.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Id. at 37.
176. Id. at 4.
177. In the Matter of: Roy S. Moore Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Court of the
Judiciary Case No. 33, at 12.
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isolates religion outside of the secular legal scheme. Accordingly, given the
prevailing authority of the modern paradigm, legal scholars have generally
been blinded from seeing that advocating a Christian foundation for U.S.
law signals a direct challenge to the secular foundation of law and a return
to a pre-modern paradigm of law and religion.
For new paradigms to become visible, Kuhn maintains "that crises are
a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories" and that
"once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared
invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place."' 78
Once these problems become acute, a new paradigm can gain acceptance if
it is successful at solving some of these acute problems.17 9 Kuhn empha-
sizes, however, that "even severe and prolonged anomalies" will not result
in falsifying a paradigm.18° A paradigm becomes "invalid only if an alter-
native candidate is available to take its place" because "[t]he decision to
reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept
another."18'
Assuming Kuhn's analysis of scientific paradigms holds for paradigms
about law and religion, the purpose of this Section will be to introduce two
quandaries or crises for legal theory-legal indeterminacy and the onto-
logical gap between legal theory and legal practice. These two quandaries
call into question the modern paradigm and its notion of secularization of
the law. Section IV will also argue that deconstructive postmodern thought
functions mainly as a critique of the modern paradigm rather than propos-
ing a third paradigm of law and religion. Deconstructive postmodern
thought does not constitute a paradigm because it fails to provide a norma-
tive theory of law explaining the legitimation of law and indicating law's
relationship to religion. If theses crises turn out to be significant, this arti-
cle will have paved the way for the emergence of a new constructive
postmodern paradigm for law and religion that provides a normative the-
ory of law that can reconcile legal indeterminacy, the comprehensive na-
ture of religion, and religious pluralism while closing the ontological gap
between legal theory and legal practice. A more detailed account of this
new constructive postmodern paradigm will have to wait for a subsequent
article entitled Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part II): A New Para-
digm for Law and Religion.
A. The Advent of Legal Indeterminacy
The first important quandary or crisis for the modern paradigm con-
cerns the juxtaposition of the overwhelming consensus that the law is inde-
terminate with the lack of consensus regarding the normative justification
of the law under the conditions of legal indeterminancy. There is also little
consensus about the degree or scope of legal indeterminacy. For example,
178. Kuhn, supra note 1, at 77.
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id. at 77.
181. Id.
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extreme-radical deconstructionists such as Anthony D'Amato have argued
that even the U.S. constitutional requirement that the President be thirty-
five years of age is not an easy case (i.e., indeterminate). 182 On the other
extreme, even contemporary legal formalists, such as Ernest Weinrib, claim
that "[n]othing about formalism precludes indeterminacy." '183 Weinrib ar-
gues that "formalism does not rely on the antecedent determinacy for par-
ticular cases of the concepts entrenched in positive law," but that "the
organ of positive law has the function of determining an antecedently inde-
terminate controversy.118 4 Consequently, in its weaker forms, the indeter-
minacy thesis merely signals the almost universal rejection of strong legal
formalism.
Christopher Columbus Langdell is often considered the archetype of
strong legal formalism.' 85 He regarded law as a science and claimed that
"all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books." '186 Langdell further argued that common law cases could be re-
duced to a formal system and that the judge, like a technician, could deter-
mine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic by pigeonholing cases
into the formal system.187 In other words, strong legal formalism maintains
that legal decision making is essentially a deductive process whereby the
application of legal rules results in determinative outcomes from the con-
straints imposed by the language of the law. 188 Strong legal formalism thus
provided a formidable argument that under the modern paradigm, judges
can decide cases independently of extra-legal norms from morality, politics,
and religion.
To the contrary, both the Legal Realists and the Critical Legal Studies
Movement ("CLS") have forcefully undermined the feasibility of strong
legal formalism by demonstrating the indeterminacy of the law. In fact, the
origin of the consensus about the indeterminacy of the law can be traced
back to the legal realists critique of Langdell and other strong legal formal-
ists.18 9 For example, Karl Llewellyn rejects deductive legal certainty and
182. D'Amato, supra note 23, at 250. D'Amato notes that "[d]econstructionists say that all inter-
pretation depends on context. Radical deconstructionists add that, because contexts can change, there
can be no such thing as a single interpretation of any text that is absolute and unchanging for all time."
Id. at 252; see also Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word "Bird", 84
Nw. L. REV. 536 (1990).
183. Weinrib, supra note 23, at 1008.
184. Id.
185. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1977).
186. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (1967). For further discussion of the
dominance of strong legal formalism from the Civil War to World War I, see GILMORE, supra, note 185,
at 41-67.
187. See id. at 43-44.
188. Cf MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 33
(1998) (discussing the "new" versus the "old" legal formalism); see also David A. Strauss, The Role of a
Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 539 (1992). In discussing the conception of the Bill of Rights as a
Code, Strauss defines formalism as including "three things: a heavy reliance on the precise language of
the text; a pretense that the text resolves more issues than it actually does; and an effort to shift respon-
sibility for a decision away from the actual decisionmaker and to some other party, such as the Fram-
ers." Id. at 544.
189. GILMORE, supra, note 185, at 42-43.
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argues that "legal rules do not lay down any limits within which a judge
moves."19 Llewellyn further maintains that:
a legal rule functions not as a closed space within which one
remains, but rather as a bough whose branches are growing;
in short, as a guideline and not as a starting premise; not as
inflexible iron armor which constrains or even forbids
growth, but as a skeleton which supports and conditions
growth, and even promotes and in some particulars liberates
it. 191
For legal realists, this understanding of legal rules entails a rule scepticism
that recognizes the indeterminacy of law.
CLS is also well known for its deconstructive critique of legal formal-
ism and claims for radical indeterminacy of the law. Along with feminist
legal theory and critical race theory, it rejects not only strong legal formal-
ism but also any attempt to find a rational principle that can resolve legal
indeterminacy. These deconstructive critiques disavow the possibility of an
apolitical legitimation of law and mainly focus on deconstructing the law to
identify its hidden biases relating to race, gender, and class. 192 As a propo-
nent of CLS, Mark Kelman concludes "that the legal system is invariably
simultaneously philosophically committed to mirror-image contradictory
norms, each of which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter
how 'easy' the case first appears)" and that "settled justificatory schemes
are in fact unattainable."'' 93
Although there is little consensus about nature and degree of legal
indeterminacy, 94 most legal theorists have come to accept that the law is
indeterminate such that there are hard cases where the apparently relevant
statutes, common law, contracts, or constitutional law provisions at issue do
190. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM § 56, at 80 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi
trans., 1989).
191. Id.
192. Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Sense, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6
(1991) (arguing that "areas of law ostensibly designed for our benefit often benefit whites even more
than blacks"); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567 (1983)
(rejecting that law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of justification and
arguing that the legal order is merely the outcome of power struggles or practical compromises); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-3, 14 (1988) (maintaining that masculine
jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition of individuals as essentially separate from one another
("separation thesis") while feminist jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition that individuals are
essentially connected or related to one another ("connection thesis")).
193. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987).
194. For example, Ken Kress notes that:
[V]ersions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the court has complete
discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the plaintiff who brings suit to quiet title to
his cabin and surrounding property in the Rocky Mountains) or rather has a limited choice
among a few options (hold for defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of monetary dam-
ages or other remedies), or some position in between.
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
PRACTICE 200, 201 (Gregory Leyh ed. 1992).
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not clearly resolve the dispute. For example, the indeterminacy of the U.S.
Constitution results in many hard cases where judges arrive at conflicting
decisions about the Constitution's implications for abortion, physician-as-
sisted suicide, and same-sex marriage. Ken Kress has noted that "[tihe in-
determinacy thesis asserts that law does not constrain judges sufficiently,
raising the specter that judicial decision making is often or always illegiti-
mate."' 95 Judges must rely on extra-legal norms to resolve hard cases
which can result in inconsistent treatment of like cases and arbitrary
decisions.
Does this mean that judicial decision making is merely an arbitrary
exercise of political power? Or is it just the product of the particular life
experience of the judge? 196 Lawrence Solum responds that
if the indeterminacy thesis is true, then legal justice will fall
short of the ideal of the rule of law in at least three ways: (1)
judges will rule by arbitrary decision, because radically inde-
terminate law cannot constrain judicial decision; (2) the
laws will not be public, in the sense that the indeterminate
law that is publicized could not be the real basis for judicial
decision; and (3) there will be no basis for concluding that
like cases are treated alike, because the very ideal of legal
regularity is empty if law is radically indeterminate.' 97
Moreover, in a democratic society, this means that judges are allegedly sub-
verting democratic rule by creating the law outside of the legislative pro-
cess and that judicial decision making is illegitimate. Consequently, the
indeterminacy thesis puts into question the notion of the "Rule of Law"
and the autonomy of law presupposed by the modern paradigm.
Contemporary legal theory, however, fails to indicate how law can be
rationally legitimated under the conditions of legal indeterminacy. There
have been three types of unsatisfactory response to legal indeterminacy.
First, some legal theorists have attempted to reject the legal indeterminacy
thesis or to propose a normative theory of law to maintain the modern
paradigm's autonomous legitimation of law. Section V will consider at-
tempts by Max Weber and John Rawls to maintain the modern paradigm
195. Id. at 203.
196. Jerome Frank is well known for his claim that judicial decisions can, in principle, be ex-
plained by a psychoanalysis of a judge's life experiences. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (Peter Smith 1970) (1930). He comments that:
What we may hope some day to get from our judges are detailed autobiographies containing
the sort of material that is recounted in the autobiographical novel; or opinions annotated, by
the judge who writes them, with elaborate explorations of the background factors in his per-
sonal experience which swayed him in reaching his conclusions. For in the last push, a judge's
decisions are the outcome of his entire life-history.
Id. at 123-24.
197. Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 489 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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by rejecting legal indeterminacy and Jirgen Habermas's attempt to recon-
cile the modern paradigm's notion of secularization with legal
indeterminacy.
In addition, legal positivists usually recognize legal indeterminacy but
fail to explain how judges provide a rational legitimation for the law in
hard cases. For instance, H. L. A. Hart advocates a middle path between
formalism and rule skepticism such that the indeterminacy of the law al-
lows for "varied types of reasoning which courts characteristically use in
exercising the creative function left to them by the open texture of law in
statute or precedent." '198 Hart clarifies that this open texture or indetermi-
nacy concerns not only "particular legal rules," but also "the ultimate crite-
ria of validity," which he refers to as "the rule of recognition." '199 With
respect to the rule of recognition, this results in a paradoxical situation
where courts are determining the ultimate criteria of legal validity in the
process of deciding whether a particular law is valid.2 0 Hart claims that
"the law in such cases is fundamentally incomplete: it provides no answer to
the questions at issue in such cases" and that courts must exercise the re-
stricted law-making function which he refers to as discretion. 20 1 As a re-
sult, in hard cases, the judge "is entitled to follow standards or reasons for
decision which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those fol-
lowed by other judges faced with similar hard cases.
20 2
Finally, CLS, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory appear to
give up on a rational legitimation for law altogether and reduce law to
politics. 203 As a proponent of CLS, Roberto Unger rejects the claims that
198. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 144 (2d ed. 1989). Hart notes that the rule of recogni-
tion can be partly, but never completely, indeterminate. Id. at 148. For example, in the United States,
the United States Constitution could be indeterminate in some sense, but the rule of recognition con-
ferring authority (jurisdiction) on the court to exercise its creative powers to settle the ultimate criteria
of validity raises no doubts even though the precise scope of that power may raise some doubts. See id.
at 152.
199. Id. at 148.
200. Id. at 152.
201. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
202. Id. at 273. While denying that legal pragmatism is similar to Hart's legal positivism, Richard
Posner vigorously rejects legal formalism-the idea of "law as a system of rules and judicial decisions as
the result of deduction, with the applicable rule supplying the major, and the facts of the particular case
the minor, premise of syllogism." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 19
(2003). Rather, "[1]egal pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions as a
(qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty." Id. at 60. Posner emphasizes that "[t]he ultimate
criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonableness," which tries to achieve the "right balance be-
tween rule-of-law and case-specific consequences, continuity and creativity, long-term and short-term,
systemic and particular, rule and standard." Id. at 59, 64. Posner's legal pragmatism thus considers
"systemic and not just case-specific consequences," so that it takes into account "standard rule-of-law
virtues of generality, predictability, and impartiality," but pragmatic judges only rarely "give controlling
weight to systemic consequences as legal formalism does." Id. at 12, 59, 61.
203. David Kairys argues that:
The lack of required, legally correct rules, methodologies, or results is in part a function of the
limits of language and interpretation, which are subjective and value laden. More importantly,
indeterminacy stems from the reality that the law usually embraces and legitimizes many or all
of the conflicting values and interests involved in controversial issues and a wide and conflict-
ing array of "logical" or "reasoned" arguments and strategies of argumentation, without pro-
viding any legally required hierarchy of values or arguments or any required method for
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law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of
justification and that the legal system can be objectively defended as em-
bodying an intelligible moral order. The legal order is merely the outcome
of power struggles or practical compromises. 20 4 He thus advocates "the
purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance left-
ist aims. ' 20 5 Similarly, Robin West claims that masculine jurisprudence
proceeds from the presupposition of individuals as essentially separate
from one another ("separation thesis") while feminist jurisprudence pro-
ceeds from the presupposition that individuals are essentially connected or
related to one another ("connection thesis").20 6 Critical Race Theorists
have also tried to show that "areas of law ostensibly designed for our bene-
fit often benefit whites even more than blacks.
20 7
Given these responses, the modern paradigm can not likely maintain
the autonomy of law from political, moral and religious convictions. Legal
indeterminacy creates a crisis and still constitutes "the key issue in legal
scholarship today, '2 8 because it potentially calls into question the modern
paradigm and its notion of secularization. In other words, legal indetermi-
nacy raises a crucial normative question that the modern paradigm has
failed to answer: on what rational normative basis do judges determine
which extra-legal norms are valid and which valid norm or norms are con-
trolling in deciding hard cases? In Section V, I will show that attempts to
by Weber and Rawls to deny legal indeterminacy fail as well as Habermas's
attempt to reconcile legal indeterminacy and the modern paradigm.
B. Why Deconstructive Postmodern Thought Does Not Provide a
Third Paradigm
Before considering attempts to defend the modern paradigm from the
crisis of legal indeterminacy, some may wonder whether the previous anal-
ysis has overlooked a third paradigm-a deconstructive postmodern para-
digm (no foundation for law)-as an alternative to the modern paradigm.
For example, Step Feldman sets forth three stages of American legal
thought including premodern ("religiously rooted natural law"), modern
(ranging "from rationalism to empiricism to transcendentalism"), and
postmodern (nonfoundational, interdisciplinary, paradoxical, power-fo-
cused, socially-constructed, and self-reflexive) .209 Deconstructive
postmodern thought certainly poses a challenge to the modern paradigm
determining which is most important in a particular context. Judges then make choices, and
those choices are most fundamentally value based, or political.
David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (David Kairys ed.,
3d ed. 1998) (emphasis added).
204. Unger, supra note 192, at 565.
205. Id. at 567.
206. Robin West, supra note 192, at 1-3, 14.
207. Richard Delgado, supra note 192, at 6. See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical
Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
208. Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV., 148, 148 (1990).
209. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNisM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 51, 163-76 (2000).
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by more fully articulating the challenge of legal indeterminacy first ex-
pressed by legal realism and by adding an emphasis on the conflicting
norms within the law. It also discloses that the modern paradigm's notion
of legal autonomy requires presupposing legal formalism and a mechanical
notion of legal reasoning. Given the widespread consensus that this decon-
structive critique successfully undermines the autonomy of law, any new
paradigm must take legal indeterminacy as a given.
However, the deconstructive postmodern critique fails to provide a so-
lution to the crisis of legal indeterminacy. As noted above, Kuhn empha-
sizes that "even severe and prolonged anomalies" will not result in
falsifying a paradigm."' l A paradigm becomes invalid only when another
paradigm takes its place. The deconstructive postmodern critique only in-
sists that "law has no foundation," '  Rather than specifying a new norma-
tive legal theory, it operates mainly as a critique of the modern paradigm
without specifying how to legitimate the law under the conditions of legal
indeterminacy.
Even though the deconstructive critique attempts to deny that the law
has any foundation, Jack Balkin maintains that "deconstructive argument
encourages us to recognize a transcendent value of justice" that acts as a
standard for evaluating the current legal system in order to ameliorate any
injustice.212 He emphasizes that "deconstructive techniques (for example,
the inversion of conceptual hierarchies and the concept of iterability) have
no necessary ethical stance." ' 3 He recognizes that "deconstructive argu-
ment is a species of rhetoric" that "can be used for good or for ill depend-
ing on how it is wielded." '14 But Balkin stresses that legal theorists have
failed to recognize that deconstruction in the legal context differs from
deconstruction in the literary context. Literary deconstructionists "were
using deconstruction to show the impenetrability, mutability, and concep-
tual incoherence of all texts, not simply the texts produced by political con-
servatives. ' 215 By contrast, Balkin points out that
[liegal theorists were primarily interested in using decon-
struction for normative critical purposes. They wanted to
criticize some (but not other) doctrinal distinctions as inco-
herent, they wanted to show that some (but not other) parts
of the law were unjust and needed reform, and they wanted
to demonstrate that some (but not other) ways of thinking
had undesirable ideological effects that concealed important
210. Kuhn, supra note 1, at 77.
211. Anthony Carty, Introduction: Post-Modern Law, POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT,
REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN 6 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
212. Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 739 (2005).
213. Id. at 738.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 720.
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features of social life and therefore promoted or sustained
injustices.216
Consequently, legal scholars had to modify deconstruction for these nor-
mative purposes but often misunderstood what that entailed.
"If we deconstruct law for a critical purpose," Balkin stresses, "it must
be because we believe that there is some gap or divergence between the
law and what justice requires. ' 217 Critical deconstruction presupposes that
the law fails to meet some standard of justice. The deconstructive critique
thus presupposes an unacknowledged foundation. Balkin concludes that
"the critical use of deconstruction becomes 'transcendental' deconstruc-
tion, because it must presuppose the existence of transcendent human val-
ues articulated in culture but never adequately captured by culture." '218
Balkin's comments suggest that there is an unarticulated constructive
agenda presupposed by the critical use of deconstruction in law. By not
treating the deconstructive postmodern critique as a paradigm, I am main-
taining that articulating this constructive agenda is necessary for something
to count as a paradigm. In the current discussion, articulating these presup-
positions would result in a "constructive postmodern" paradigm of law and
religion. Philosopher David Ray Griffin refers to this type of approach as
"constructive or revisionary postmodernism".219 Griffin's use of the term
"postmodernism" helps clarify what I mean by this term. He does not take
the term postmodern to suggest adopting certain philosophical notions like
non-foundationalism. Rather, constructive postmodernism attempts "to
overcome the modern worldview not by eliminating the possibility of
worldviews as such [i.e., deconstructive postmodernism], but by construct-
ing a postmodern worldview through a revision of modern premises and
traditional concepts."22  Alternatively, Dennis Patterson defines
postmodern thought as "'any mode of thought that departs from the three
modern axes ... without reverting to premodern categories.'
22 1
216. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 739.
218. Id. See also J. M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1131 (1994) (arguing that the presupposed transcendent value of justice is "transcendental" be-
cause it is necessarily presupposed by deconstructive arguments about justice).
219. David Ray Griffin, Introduction to SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, in
FOUNDERS OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY vii, viii (David Ray Griffin, John B. Cobb,
Jr., Marcus P. Ford, Pete A. Y. Gunter, & Peter Ochs 1993).
220. Id. (arguing for a constructive postmodernism based on the philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead that "involves a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions"). See also
Zhihe Wang, The Postmodern Dimension of Whitehead's Philosophy and Its Relevance, in WHITEHEAD
AND CHINA: RELEVANCE AND RELATIONSHIPS 173-87 (Wenyu Xie, Zhihe Wang, & George E. Derfer
eds., 2005) (maintaining that aspects of Whitehead's Philosophy justify characterizing Whitehead as a
constructive "postmodern thinker").
221. DENNIS PArERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 158 (1996) (quoting Nancey Murphy & James Mc-
Clendon, Distinguishing Modem and Postmodern Theologies, 5 MOD. THEOLOGY 191, 199 (1989)). Pat-
terson defines the three axes of modernism as follows: 1) "Epistemological foundationalism-
Knowledge can only be justified to the extend it rests on indubitable foundations"; 2) "Theory of lan-
guage-Language has two functions: it represents ideas or states of affairs, or expresses the attitudes of
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Similar to both of these notions, I will use the term "constructive
postmodern paradigm" to indicate a paradigm that seeks to overcome the
two crises for the modern paradigm-legal indeterminacy (i.e., deconstruc-
tive postmodern legal thought) and the ontological gap-by revising as-
pects of the modern and pre-modern paradigms of law and religion. Thus,
my thesis is that a new constructive postmodern paradigm is needed to
provide a normative theory of law that can reconcile legal indeterminacy,
the comprehensive nature of religion, and religious pluralism, while closing
the ontological gap between legal theory and legal practice.
C. The Ontological Gap
The second issue demonstrating the need for a new paradigm of law
and religion stems from the disconnection between legal practice and legal
theory. Steven Smith argues that this disconnection stems from an onto-
logical gap between the metaphysical presuppositions informing the prac-
tice of law and the "anti-metaphysical animus" informing contemporary
legal theory which has resulted in "a jurisprudential dead end."2 2 Smith
emphasizes that "[t]he ways in which lawyers and judges (and even most
legal scholars) actually practice and talk about law are not so different than
they were a century ago-or even five centuries ago. '2 23 The contempo-
rary practice of law still presupposes a classical or religious ontology that
maintains "the reality of 'the law"' and that posits "a sort of working part-
nership between a divine author and human legislators. '224 However, he
maintains that the classical "account has been widely rejected by modern
legal thinkers as mere 'superstition.' ,,225 As a result, the religious ontology
presupposed by the practice of law is contrary to the ontology presupposed
by contemporary legal theory.
More specifically, Smith identifies "three ontological families," which
he labels "everyday ontology," "scientific ontology," and "religious ontol-
ogy." Smith argues that "'the law' . . . does not square with either the
everyday ontology or the scientific ontology that people in academic set-
tings regard as axiomatic, at least for professional purposes. "226 This clari-
fies that the ontological gap results because the practice of law presupposes
a religious ontology while contemporary legal theory presupposes a scien-
tific ontology.
The ontological gap presents a problem because the end result of ac-
cepting a scientific ontology based on "atomic physics and Darwinian
evolution," "is that the religious worldview is inadmissible for purposes of
the speaker"; and 3) "Individual and community-'Society' is best understood as an aggregations of
'social atoms."' Id. at 153 (quoting Murphy & McClendon, supra, at 199).
222. Smith, supra note 11, at xii.
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 155.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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serious thought. '22 7 To support this claim, Smith cites John Searle's con-
clusion that an unassailable scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism)
invalidates religious ontology. Smith's argument means that legal practice
is based on a defective or faculty religious ontology that lacks "academic"
credibility. Given this analysis, the question becomes whether the onto-
logical gap between legal practice and legal theory constitutes an un-
fathomable chasm that cannot be traversed or whether it can be navigated
by reforming centuries of legal practice or by positing a new religious on-
tology for legal theory.
Smith's argument resonates with an increasing focus on ontological
and religious foundations in political theory and legal theory. In political
theory, Stephen K. White identifies a weak ontology in the work of Judith
Butler, William Connolly, George Kateb, and Charles Taylor.228 White ar-
gues that this weak ontology is important for Western notions of human
rights because "our ideas of human dignity, basic equality, and respect,"
(i.e., the figuration of human being) are required to "see why we might be
creatures that share the sort of connectedness and commonality that gives
distinctive force to the idea of humanity and makes us out to be creatures
peculiarly worthy of rights. '229 With respect to legal theory, Michael Perry
has recently argued "[t]hat there is a religious ground for the morality of
human rights-indeed, more than one-is clear."23  Perry further con-
cludes that those rejecting a religious ground may have "no ground for the
morality of human rights, no warrant for the claim that every human being
has inherent dignity and is inviolable," because "Nietzsche's thought ('not
only no God, but no metaphysical order of any kind') and the morality of
human rights ... are deeply antithetical to one another.
231
Perry's analysis suggests an option that Smith does not consider. Clos-
ing the ontological gap may require a return to a religious foundation for
law. Smith seems to be viewing the available options through the modern
paradigm and its notion of secularization. Alternatively, bridging the onto-
logical gap may require a new constructive postmodern paradigm that
maintains that a plurality of religious convictions implicitly legitimates the
law. The constructive postmodern paradigm does not propose, in Smith's
terms, a unitary religious ontological foundation for law. Rather, it claims
that each individual interpreting the law presupposes a religious ontologi-
cal foundation. As noted in Part A, Ogden's definition of religion makes
227. Id. at 34.
228. See generally STEPHEN K. WHITE, SUSTAINING AFFIRMATION: THE STRENGTHS OF WEAK
ONTOLOGY IN POLITICAL THEORY (2000).
229. Stephen K. White, Weak Ontology: Genealogy and Critical Issues, 7 HEDGEHOG REV. 11, 23
(2005) (Special Issue including articles by Judith Butler, William Connolly, George Kateb, and Charles
Taylor, and others regarding Commitments in a Post-Foundationalist World: Exploring the Possibilities
of "Weak Ontology").
230. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at xi. See also PERRY, THE
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 29 (arguing that "if-the conviction that every human being
is sacred is inescapably religious, it follows that the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious, be-
cause the conviction is an essential, even foundational, constituent of the idea").
231. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 26, 29.
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clear that religious convictions are the comprehensive condition of validity
that are presupposed by any normative judgment. Religious convictions
include both an ethical aspect (a notion of authentic human existence) and
a metaphysical aspect (the meaning of ultimate reality for US). 2 3 2 Conse-
quently, as Smith's argument implicitly acknowledges, each act of legal in-
terpretation presupposes a religious ontology and notion of authentic
human existence. Taken collectively, there is a plurality of religious ontolo-
gies implicitly legitimating the law.
V. THREE VERSIONS OF THE MODERN PARADIGM: MAX WEBER, JOHN
RAWLS, AND JORGEN HABERMAS
The different theories of law under the modern paradigm all attempt
to preserve the autonomy of law so that law has a secular foundation. This
Section and Section VI will discuss the theories of law proposed or implied
by Max Weber, John Rawls, and Jirgen Habermas, and French secularism.
In their own way, each of these theories of law aspires to make the law
secular or neutral as among different religious convictions so that the state
does not favor one religion over others. While this aspiration is admirable,
I will show that the four main ways of trying to secure the autonomy of law
from religion fail for one or several of the following reasons: 1) they deny
legal indeterminacy; 2) they are incoherent; or 3) they require establishing
a comprehensive secularism in violation of a proper understanding of relig-
ious pluralism and the Establishment Clause. My critiques of these posi-
tions will be fairly brief but will refer to longer critiques of several of these
positions in previous articles.
A. Weber's Legal Positivism and Legal Formalism
Max Weber's positivistic theory of law233 sets forth the classic state-
ment of the modern paradigm. Based on his descriptive account of the
rationalization or secularization of law, Weber claims that law can be legiti-
mated by its legality. Legality, as discussed above, merely means that a
formal process of positively enacting law (via certain procedures that are
believed to be legitimate in the existing regime) was followed. No substan-
tive criteria of justice must be met. Further, law cannot draw any legitimiz-
ing force from morality or from comprehensive religious or metaphysical
worldviews.234 The rationalization of society and law has eliminated these
traditional or value-rational bases of legitimation. Law possesses its own
232. See supra note 111.
233. In the legal context, positivism usually means that law is not legitimated by morality (rational
normative justification) but is legitimated by following the established formal procedures for enacting a
law (facticity). In other words, the primary purpose of legal theory is descriptive (including the process
of normative justification) rather than normative. See, e.g., HART, supra note 198, at 240 (claiming in
the new appendix to THE CONCEPT OF LAW that his "account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral
and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the
forms and structures which appear in [his] general account of law") (emphasis in original).
234. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 172, at 219; 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNI-
CATIVE ACTION, supra note 160, at 259.
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independent rationality; it is not reducible to morality or political power.
"[L]aw is precisely what the political legislator-whether democratic or
not-enacts as law in accordance with a legally institutionalized proce-
dure. '235 Weber detaches law from moral-practical rationality and reduces
law to that which was positively enacted according to the accepted
procedures. 36
In addition, Weber argues that the secularization or rationalization of
law finally leads to a formalistic system of law. In its ideal form, law be-
comes a "legal science," which maximizes the calculability of social action
by maximizing the use of instrumental rationality. Legal science has "the
highest measure of methodological and logical rationality" that Weber
summarizes in five postulates.
37
1. "every concrete legal decision be the 'application' of an
abstract legal proposition to a concrete 'fact situation';"
2. "it must be possible in every concrete case to derive the
decision from abstract legal propositions by means of le-
gal logic;"
3. "the law must actually or virtually constitute a 'gapless'
system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated
as if it were such a gapless system;"
4. "whatever cannot be 'construed' rationally in legal
terms is also legally irrelevant; and"
5. "every social action must always be visualized as either
an 'application' or 'execution' of legal propositions, or
as an 'infringement' thereof.
238
For Weber, the "'gaplessness' of the legal system" results "in a gapless
'legal ordering' of all social conduct" so that the law is sealed off from
morality, politics, and religion.2 39 This "[j]uridical formalism enables the
legal system to operate like a technically rational machine. '240 As noted in
the discussion of Langdell's theory above, mechanical accounts of jurispru-
dence like Weber's are often refered to as strong legal formalism because
they posit such a strong deductive character of judicial decision making and
a strong autonomy of law from politics, morality, and religion.241 Without
this strong legal formalism, "the juristic precision of judicial opinions will
be seriously impaired if sociological, economic, or ethical argument were to
take the place of legal concepts. '242 Weber's classic statement of seculari-
zation makes clear that the autonomy of law presupposes a strong legal
235. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 172, at 219.
236. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 160, at 262.
237. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 168, at 657.
238. Id. at 657-58.
239. Id. at 658.
240. Id. at 811.
241. See text accompanying notes 185-188 (discussing and criticizing Langdell's strong legal
formalism).
242. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 168, at 894.
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formalism to prevent religious, moral, political, or other non-legal argu-
ments from compromising the autonomy of law during its application.
Consequently, unlike most contemporary legal theorists, Weber under-
stands that the secularization of law can only be sustained during the appli-
cation of law by strong legal formalism.
Despite his reliance on Weber's theory or rationalization or seculariza-
tion of the law, Habermas rejects positivistic theories of law and strong
legal formalism. For example, Habermas shows that Weber's theory of le-
gality as legitimacy is circular. According to Habermas, "[ilt remains un-
clear how the belief in legality is supposed to summon up the force of
legitimation if legality means only conformity with an actually existing legal
order, and if this order, as arbitrarily enacted law, is not in turn open to
practical-moral justification." '243 This belief in legality merely presupposes
that the legal order is legitimate. In other words, a belief that certain pro-
cedures will produce valid laws does not make it so; "the belief in legality
does not per se legitimize." '244 Those procedures must themselves be legiti-
mized. Weber theory is fatally circular because he merely presupposes or
believes in their validity.245
Despite these fatal flaws, Weber's positivistic theory of law shows that
one of the founders of secularization theory thought that strong legal for-
malism was essential for preserving the autonomy of law. In an absolute
sense, Weber appears right that without strong legal formalism, judges can
243. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 160, at 265 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 97-99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) [here-
inafter HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS]. See also John P. McCormick, Max Weber and JAirgen
Habermas: The Sociology and Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
297, 311 (1997)(arguing that "the riddle of whether mere legality could entail legitimacy" left un-
resolved by Weber's "thin notion of legal validity" is central to Habermas's analysis of law); David
Ingram, The Subject of Justice in Postmodern Discourse: Aesthetic Judgment and Political Rationality, in
HABERMAS AND THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (Maurizio Passerin d'Entr~ves & Seyla Benhabib eds. 1997) (arguing that
"Habermas's critical philosophy seeks to justify modernity in the face of Weber's paradoxes: the relativ-
ism of rational value spheres that ostensibly givers rise to social pathology and the identifications of
social rationalization with capitalism").
244. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 243, at 99; JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUrIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 202 (Wil-
liam Rehg trans., 1996). Alternatively, Harold Berman criticizes Weber's legal positivism for different
reasons. He maintains that Weber's
misunderstanding of religion . . . especially of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lutheran
and Calvinist Protestantism in Germany and England, respectively, was coupled with a misun-
derstanding of the legal developments that took place in those countries during those centu-
ries, and in both cases this was due to the fallacy of his sharp separation of fact from value and
of his strict positivist view of law as fact alone and as primarily an instrument of political
coercion.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 28.
245. Habermas's argument also applies to other positivistic theories because they also define le-
gality merely in terms of a set of existing formal procedures without legitimizing those procedures. See,
e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 198, at 110, 101 (arguing that the rule of recognition is
the criteria that determines the validity of laws in the legal system but "its existence is a matter of fact"
so that "[f]or the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in
which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other officials or private persons or their
advisors.").
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rely on personal moral, political, and religious beliefs in hard cases. The
widespread rejection of strong legal formalism alone should raise serious
questions about the continued viability of the modern paradigm. Conse-
quently, the modern paradigm may have remained in place not because
legal scholars think the autonomy of law is feasible but because no ade-
quate paradigm has yet been offered to take its place.
B. John Rawls's Political and Legal Liberalism246
John Rawls's political and legal liberalism embraces the modern para-
digm and relies on a normative theory of law and a weak version of legal
formalism to maintain the autonomy of law. In evaluating Rawls's political
and legal liberalism, the following focuses on the idea of public reason and,
Rawls claim that judges should rely on public reason in hard cases involv-
ing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.247
In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that from two basic ideas (the
idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and the idea of persons as
free and equal) implicit in a democratic political culture, we can specify the
conditions (i.e., the original position - including its thick veil of ignorance)
for coming to an agreement on a political conception of justice in a demo-
cratic society. Rawls claims that this thought experiment establishes this
conception of justice as "freestanding" (i.e., "political not metaphysical") in
that it does not depend upon a comprehensive doctrine for its justifica-
tion. 48 However, Rawls argues that "an agreement on a political concep-
tion of justice is to no effect without a companion agreement on guidelines
of public inquiry and rules for assessing evidence." 249 Rawls argues that his
idea of public reason indicates what these guidelines and rules would entail
in a democratic society of free and equal citizens. The "content of public
reason" is formulated by a political conception of justice ("political values
of public reason") which includes two parts and two values: 1) substantive
principles of justice for the basic structure ("the values of political justice"),
and 2) "guidelines of inquiry" including "principles of reasoning and rules
of evidence in light of which citizens are to decide whether substantive
principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy
them" ("the values of public reason").
25 0
With respect to public reason, Rawls holds out judicial decision mak-
ing as the ideal type. Rawls maintains that "public reason is the sole reason
246. For a more complete analysis of Rawls' position from which parts of this section are derived,
see MARK C. MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 89-135 (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2002) (on file with
author); see also Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting International Law, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 263, 279-
85 (2003); Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making and The De
Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 255, 266-71 (1998).
247. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 767 (1997) [herein-
after Rawls, Public Reason Revisited]. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (paperback ed.
1996)[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
248. Id. at 10.
249. Id. at 139.
250. Id. at 223-24.
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the court exercises. It is the only branch of government that is visibly on its
face the creature of that reason and of that reason alone. 251 Judges have
"no other reason and no other values than the political. ' 25 2 Rawls holds
out the United States Supreme Court as the "exemplar of public reason"
and emphasizes that
[t]he justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal
morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally.
Those they must view as irrelevant. Equally, they cannot
invoke their or other people's religious or philosophical
views. Nor can they cite political values without restriction.
Rather, they must appeal to the political values they think
belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public
conception and its political values of justice and public
reason.
253
Thus, when the relevant legal materials are indeterminate, Rawls maintains
that judges must rely on the political values of public reason alone. The
political values of public reason function like a higher law which provides
answers in hard cases and which informs judges' interpretations of prior
precedent.
Michael Perry has emphasized, however, that Rawls fails to tell us
what a judge may rely on if the political values of public reason (political
conception of justice), like the relevant legal materials, are indetermi-
nate.254 Rawls argues that this is rare, 255 but Perry has emphasized that "he
is simply wrong. '2 56 While Rawls does not say much about this potential
legal indeterminacy, he cites Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law
approvingly,257 so Dworkin's theory will be used to try to respond to
Perry's allegations.
Ronald Dworkin maintains that his interpretative theory of law pro-
vides an understanding of law that is quite determinate so that the law
provides "right answers" (even in hard cases) based on the criteria of "fit"
with prior precedent and "justification" according to the principles of polit-
ical morality underlying the law. 8 With respect to fit, he argues that "in a
modern, developed, and complex [legal] system" a tie with respect to fit
would be "so rare as to be exotic. '2 59 The principles of political morality
can further determine a right answer when the criteria of fit fails so that
251. Id. at 235.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
254. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES
103 (1997) [hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS].
255. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at liii.
256. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 254, at 103.
257. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at 237 n.23.
258. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225,255 (1986). Despite much criticism, Dworkin contin-
ues to embrace his right answer thesis. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 41-43 (2006).
259. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (1985).
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"[i]f there is no right answer in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some
more problematic type of indeterminacy or incommensurability in moral
theory. "260 In the final analysis, Dworkin's interpretative theory of law
constitutes a weak legal formalism which maintains that the law has ade-
quate resources to come to determinate results in all cases.26 a
To the contrary, Habermas claims that Dworkin's "coherence theory
of law can avoid the indeterminacy supposedly due to the contradictory
structure of the legal system only at the cost of the theory itself becoming
somehow indeterminate. ' 262 Habermas argues that this indeterminacy re-
sults from what has been referred to as the "ripple effect argument.
263
The ripple effect argument shows that coherency theories require a recon-
struction of the system of legal norms in every hard case which results in a
continuous reconfiguration of the system of legal norms and amounts to a
retroactive interpretation of existing law. Each hard case thus creates a
ripple in the coherent system of legal norms and makes the entire system of
law indeterminate. Given Dworkin's failure, the legal liberalism embraced
by Dworkin and Rawls fails to maintain the autonomy of law which puts
the modern paradigm into question.
Rawls legal liberalism further fails because it depends on a hidden
(negative) comprehensive liberal secularism (i.e., a comprehensive denial
of comprehensive convictions) that religious judges (i.e., judges recognizing
the comprehensive order of reflection) cannot accept and that leads to self-
contradiction. Rawls argues that in order for the political values alone to
"give a reasonable answer to all, or nearly all, questions involving constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice," the ordering of values must
be made "in light of their structure and features within the political concep-
tion itself, and not primarily from how they occur within citizens' compre-
hensive doctrines." '264 These political values should not be viewed
separately or detached from one another. Rawls stresses that "[t]hey are
not puppets manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive
doctrines." '265
No religious judge, however, could accept this "political not metaphys-
ical" ordering of political values in hard cases. Recall that a comprehensive
or religious conviction "purports to identify the necessary and sufficient
260. Id. at 144.
261. Brian Leiter similarly describes Dworkin as a "sophisticated formalist . . . who has a rich
theory of legal reasoning," but "still remains within the formalist camp because he sees the law as
rationally determinate and he denies that judges have strong discretion (i.e., he denies that their deci-
sions are not bound by authoritative legal standards)." Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN Ju-
RISPRUDENCE (1998)). See also John P. McCormick, Max Weber and Jargen Habermas: The Sociology
and Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 297, 324 (1997) (characteriz-
ing Dworkin as embracing a "reformed formalism").
262. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 219.
263. Id. (citing Ken Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis,
Rectroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369 (1984)).
264. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 247, at 777.
265. Id.
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moral condition or comprehensive condition of all valid moral claims.
266
For a religious judge, an ordering of political values is valid only if it coin-
cides with the ordering dictated by her comprehensive or religious convic-
tions. Yet, Rawls's political liberalism maintains that the political values of
public reason must be ordered exclusively by a "political not metaphysical"
conception of justice (freestanding) even in hard cases. In other words, this
requires that every judge not embracing Rawls's liberal secularism to reject
the claim that his or her comprehensive conviction is valid or reject that it
is the "comprehensive condition of all valid moral claims." Only those
judges who embrace Rawls's liberal secularism (i.e., comprehensive denial
of all comprehensive convictions) could accept Rawls "political not meta-
physical" ordering of political values in hard cases.2 67 As a result, it is not
clear how the political values of public reason could be the subject of an
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that Rawls
claims is required for a stable society. 268 Either the acceptance of the ex-
clusive political ordering of the political values is a mere modus vivendi and
inherently unstable, or no consensus is possible and there are a plurality of
orderings of the political values informing the law as proposed by the con-
structive postmodern paradigm.
Moreover, Rawls's position may finally be incoherent. Rawls has re-
cently admitted that the idea of a well ordered society set forth in A Theory
of Justice was unrealistic because it required citizens to adopt a "compre-
hensive liberalism" (which is unrealistic to expect) in order for a just soci-
ety to be stable. 69 In other words, he recognizes that A Theory of Justice
proposed a "comprehensive liberalism," but he maintains that Political Lib-
eralism only proposes a "political liberalism." Rawls claims that an objec-
tive legitimation of law must be independent of comprehensive doctrines or
convictions (i.e., based on the political values of public reason) because
comprehensive convictions are nonpublic (i.e., not rational). Contrary to
his aspirations, Rawls's claim entails a comprehensive denial of all compre-
hensive convictions (a (negative) comprehensive liberal secularism),27 °
which according to Rawls is not possible, and thus results in an incoherent
266. GAMWELL, supra note 112, at 70-71.
267. Franklin Gamwell argues that "[alt best, in other words, the consensus that Rawls's political
liberalism requires is joined only by those who deny all comprehensive convictions, citizens who believe
that principles of justice are independent of any particular answer to the comprehensive question be-
cause no comprehensive conviction is valid." Id. at 73. See also Abner S. Greene, Uncommon
Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism and Life's Dominion, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 670
(1994)(book review)("the effect of Rawls' theory is to favor certain comprehensive doctrines over
others without compensation").
268. In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes it clear that he thinks the political conceptions of justice
must be supported by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. RAWLS, POLIT-
ICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at 147-48. In other words, after the principles of justice are gener-
ated by the original position, they must then be affirmed from within the comprehensive doctrines he
refers to as reasonable.
269. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at xvii.
270. I refer to Rawls's comprehensive denial of comprehensive convictions as a (negative) com-
prehensive secularism because its claim that there are no objective (i.e., rational) comprehensive convic-
tions about authentic human existence is comprehensive and negative-a denial of objective religious
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account of the modern paradigm. In this respect, Franklin Gamwell argues
that "[b]ecause a denial of all religious or comprehensive convictions is
itself a (negative) comprehensive claim, it prevents the validation or justifi-
cation of any positive beliefs about human authenticity, comprehensive or
otherwise. '271 Rawls's claim then that the political values of public reason
must be independent of comprehensive convictions implies a comprehen-
sive denial of comprehensive convictions (i.e., a negative comprehensive
conviction) and is self-refuting. Therefore, Rawls's legal liberalism is inco-
herent. Its basis for prohibiting judicial reliance on comprehensive convic-
tions in hard cases is itself based on a (negative) comprehensive liberal
secularism.
In addition, the failure of Rawls's theory to generate an overlapping
consensus means that Rawls's comprehensive denial of comprehensive con-
victions must be established as the official comprehensive conviction. This
is required to ensure that in hard cases the political values of public reason
are ordered exclusively by a "political not metaphysical" conception of jus-
tice (freestanding). Establishing this comprehensive liberal secularism,
however, would violate the Establishment Clause and a proper understand-
ing of religious pluralism. The discussion of French republican secularism
in Section VI clarifies why this violates the Establishement Clause. The
normative requirements of pluralistic inclusivism discussed in Section III.
B. also prohibit establishing a religion because this cuts off the pursuit of
religious truth which is an ongoing process of reflection. Hence, Rawls's
normative theory of law-legal liberalism-does not maintain the seculari-
zation or autonomy of law because it is incoherent, violates the Establish-
ment Clause and religious pluralism, and fails to save the modern paradigm
from legal indeterminacy.
C. Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law
272
Unlike Weber and Rawls, JUrgen Habermas's discourse theory of law
attempts to reconcile the modern paradigm and its notion of secularization
with legal indeterminacy. He attempts to rely on a normative theory of law
truth. While we might debate what "objectively rational" means, Rawls's position appears to acknowl-
edge only secular claims can be objectively rational and for this reason is referred to as a type of
secularism.
271. GAMWELL, supra note 112, at 139. Gamwell further clarifies that "[i]f there is no character or
positive principle of human authenticity that is valid under all historical conditions, then all valid under-
standings of human authenticity must be relative to some or other specific circumstances. But, then, no
moral claim could be justified without validating moral relativism, and moral relativism is a positive
claim about human authenticity, the validity of which cannot be relative to specific circumstances. To
assert that the moral norms of every actual and possible human activity are in all respects relative is to
make a positive claim about human activity that is comprehensive. In other words, moral relativism is
self-refuting because it implies the comprehensive condition that it denies, and therefore, the denial of
all comprehensive convictions prevents the validation of any moral claim at all." Id. at 139-40.
272. For a more detailed treatment of Habermas's adoption and modification of Weber's social
theory and a more detailed summary and critique of Habermas's discourse theory of law, see Modak-
Truran, Secularization, Legal Indeterminacy, and Habermas, supra note 144, at 84-118, and Modak-
Truran, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law, supra note 144, at 464-82.
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to maintain the autonomy of law despite legal indeterminacy. The follow-
ing will briefly summarize the discourses of justification and application
before focusing on Habermas's notion of legal paradigms as a source for
resolving hard cares.
Relying on and slightly modifying Max Weber's social theory and soci-
ology of law, Habermas argues that the rationalization of society (i.e., secu-
larization) has eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications for law
and has differentiated law from politics and morality. Once religious and
metaphysical worldviews have been eliminated as a justification for law,
law must be legitimated-in a seemingly paradoxical manner-by its legal-
ity (i.e., by positive enactment according to certain formal procedures).
Habermas concludes that "[t]he democratic procedure for the production
of law evidently forms the only postmetaphysical [i.e., postreligious] source
of legitimacy.
2 73
In the discourse of justification, Habermas argues that "the legitimacy
of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as participants
in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine
whether a contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agreement
of all those possibly affected. '2 74 Habermas further maintains that the dis-
enchantment of the world eliminated the possibility of an "objective" legiti-
mation of law. Assuming rationality still has some non-subjective meaning,
intersubjective agreement must then become the arbiter of legitimation.
Thus, the discourse of justification legitimates the law based on the proce-
dures of the discourse principle-intersubjective rational agreement among
all those affected after free and full debate.275
At the same time, Habermas is uniquely aware of the importance of
maintaining the independence of law from religion, morality, and politics
(i.e., a secularized notion of law) despite the threats posed by legal indeter-
minacy in the application of the law. Habermas maintains that the principle
of appropriateness and the discourse of application allow for an impartial
application of law that is independent of religious or metaphysical
worldviews. The discourse of justification justifies legal norms that are then
applied by judges in the discourse of application. At the same time,
Habermas claims that almost "all [legal] norms are inherently indetermi-
nate, '2 76 but he contends that the discourse of application does not reopen
the question of legitimation and that judges can come to a "'single right'
decision[ ]" in every case.2 77 To determine which valid legal norm is most
appropriate in a particular case, Habermas asserts that "one must first
273. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 448.
274. Id. at 104; see also HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 160, at 261-
62 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
275. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 103-04.
276. Id. (emphasis in original).
277. Id. at 220.
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enter a discourse of application to test whether they apply to a given situa-
tion (whose details could not have been anticipated in the justification pro-
cess) or whether, their validity notwithstanding, they must give way to
another norm, namely the 'appropriate' one. '2 78 The selection of the "sin-
gle appropriate norm" for a particular situation is what first confers "the
determinate shape of a coherent order on the unordered mass of valid
norms." 279 The judge is not an interstitial legislator creating new legal
norms from extra legal norms. Rather, she searches for the appropriate
norm in the system of legal norms and reconstructs that system to make it
the best she can in light of her application of the appropriate norm.
Habermas's discourse theory of law thus recognizes a complete indepen-
dence between judicial decision making and judges' personal convictions-
whether they are comprehensive, religious, political, or moral.
As noted in Part B, Habermas claims that Dworkin's "coherence the-
ory of law can avoid the indeterminancy supposedly due to the contradic-
tory structure of the legal system only at the cost of the theory itself
becoming somehow indeterminate. 28 ° In addition, Dworkin's process of
rational reconstruction places unreasonable demands on judges and over-
taxes the process of adjudication. Habermas contends that the complexity
and uncertainty of this task are reduced by the "paradigmatic legal under-
standing prevailing at the time." Judges can rely on this paradigmatic legal
understanding to help determine which principle is appropriate without re-
constructing the whole system of legal norms. Habermas embraces Fried-
rich Kubler's characterization of the legal paradigm as playing a guiding
role for judicial decision making: "it determines how the law is understood
and construed; it stipulates which places, in which direction, and to what
extent statutory law ... is to be supplemented and modified by doctrinal
commentary and judge-made law ... and this means: it bears part of the
responsibility for the future of social existence. 281
Habermas asserts that there are only three legal paradigms currently
in contention to play this guiding role in judicial decision making. Please
note that these legal paradigms are not the paradigms of law and religion
that I am focusing on. Rather, he identifies the formal liberal paradigm,
the materialist social-welfare paradigm, and the proceduralist paradigm.
The liberal paradigm envisions society as "tailored for the autonomy of
legal subjects who, primarily as market participants, would seek and find
their happiness by pursuing their own particular interests as rationally as
possible. 28 2 As a reaction to the failures of this formalistic system of nega-
tive rights, the social-welfare paradigm proposed a material conception of
positive rights that granted individuals entitlements to promote social
equality in an unequal society. This introduced "a new category of basic
278. Id. at 217.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 219.
281. Id. at 394 (quoting Friedrich Kubler, Ober die praktischen Aufgaben zeitgemiBer Priva-
trechtstheorie 51(Karlsruhe 1975).
282. Id. at 401.
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rights grounding claims to a more just distribution of social wealth (and a
more effective protection from socially produced dangers). 283
Despite the continued presence of the liberal and social-welfare para-
digms, Habermas claims that the current legal paradigm should be under-
stood as proceduralist. This proceduralist paradigm has arisen from the
contest between the liberal and social-welfare paradigms and their failure
to achieve a proper relationship between private and public autonomy. He
further identifies the dispute over legal paradigms as essentially a "political
dispute" that should not be decided by the legal elite. Habermas claims
that "[t]he paradigmatic preunderstanding of law in general can limit the
indeterminancy of theoretically informed decision making and guarantee a
sufficient measure of legal certainty only if it is intersubjectively shared by
all citizens and expresses a self-understanding of the legal community as a
whole. ' 284 Although there seems to be an empirical component to identi-
fying the legal paradigms in contention (facticity), the legal paradigm that
is to be shared by all citizens should be validated according to the
proceduralist paradigm. Unlike the liberal and social-welfare paradigms,
the proceduralist paradigm no longer favors a particular ideal of society, a
particular vision of the good life, or even a particular political option. It is
formal in the sense that it merely states the necessary conditions under
which legal subjects in their role of enfranchised citizens can reach an un-
derstanding with one another about what their problems are and how they
are to be solved. 285 The proceduralist paradigm allows not only for the
revision of the conditions it prescribes for subjects to reach understanding
but also for the reexamination of the paradigm itself when any perceived
change in the social context seems to warrant this. Consequently,
Habermas argues that this allows not just legal experts but all participants
to participate in determining and continually reevaluating the validity of
the legal paradigm for society.
Nevertheless, Habermas's proceduralist paradigm fails to solve the in-
determinacy of law and preserve the secularization or autonomy of law
283. Id. at 402-03.
284. Id. at 223. Habermas's argument here seems very similar to the German school of historical
jurisprudence, which "considered law to be an integral part of the common consciousness of the nation,
organically connected with the mind and the spirit of the people [i.e.,Volksgeist]." HAROLD J. BERMAN,
FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 299 (1993). Harold Berman notes
that Freidrich Karl von Savigny's
historical school emphasized the ultimate source of law in the older Germanic (germanishe)
tradition of popular participation in lawmaking and adjudication as well as the more modern
German (deutsche) tradition of professional scholarly interpretation and systematization of
the jus commune, the common law, which had been developed over the centuries out of the
texts of the Roman law of Justinian and the canon law of the Church .... the German jus
commune was supposed to reflect the common consciousness of the German nation, as it has
developed over time.
Id. at 300. More specifically, Berman links Habermas to the German school of historical jurisprudence
by noting that, in October 1986, Habermas justified the abolition of capital punishment in Germany by
stating that "'after what Germany lived through under Nazism, it would have been impossible to re-
store capital punishment."' Id. at 301.
285. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 445.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
under the modern paradigm of law and religion. As noted above,
Habermas claims both that almost all legal norms are indeterminate and
that the discourse of application itself is indeterminate because of the con-
tinual reconstruction of legal norms into a coherent system in their applica-
tion. His solution was to offer the notion of a legal paradigm. This notion
presents several problems that undermine the impartiality and validity of
the discourse of application and puts into question his discourse theory of
law and the modern paradigm of law and religion.
The first problem concerns choosing among the contending legal para-
digms. Habermas notes that there is a contest among the liberal, social wel-
fare, and proceduralist paradigms that must be resolved.286 Habermas
contends that the legal paradigm can limit indeterminacy and "guarantee a
sufficient measure of legal certainty only if it is intersubjectively shared by
all citizens and expresses a self-understanding of the legal community as a
whole."'2 87 To achieve this shared legal paradigm, he claims that the
proceduralist paradigm would allow this decision to be made in a demo-
cratic way, like the process of justification.288 Rather than judges deciding
what the legal paradigm should be, all affected could agree on a legal para-
digm under ideal speech conditions, like in the discourse of justification.
This would only solve the indeterminacy problem, however, if the discourse
of justification can provide a coherent, rational justification of the law that
supports the autonomy of the law. In a prior article, I pointed out many
reasons-including self-contradiction like Rawls-why Habermas's dis-
course of justification fails to justify the procedural requirements of the
discourse of justification and the autonomy of the law.28 9
Even assuming that the discourse of justification succeeds in providing
a coherent, rational justification of the law, legal paradigms may fail to
solve the indeterminacy problem because they are indeterminate.
Habermas notes that legal norms are not self-interpreting and that, except
286. Id. at 437-38.
287. Id. at 223.
288. Id. at 443-46.
289. In addition, Habermas maintains that "the universalization principle acts like a knife that
makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good
and the just." JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 104 (Chris-
tian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) [hereinafter HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS]. In order for a law to be impartial (i.e., not violate moral norms), Habermas's posmetaphysical,
rational justification of law appears to depend upon the possibility of these razor-sharp cuts. Otherwise,
the ethical-political and pragmatic reasons would result in a consensus based on strategic or prudential
rationality like Hobbes. In that case, the consensus signals not a notion of intersubjective rational valid-
ity but a confluence of subjective interests. However, it is unclear how Habermas can justify his distinc-
tion between ethical-political and pragmatic reasons and moral reasons because this is itself a claim
about the good. "To assert that all good human purposes are in all respects historically specific is itself a
universal evaluation of human purposes . . . . In other words, the assertion is self-refuting." Franklin I.
Gamwell, Metaphysics and the Rationalization of Society, 23 PROCESS STUDIES 219, 230 (1994). As a
result, Habermas's discourse theory of law fails to provide an impartial or rational justification for law
that supports legal autonomy. For a more detailed critique of Habermas's discourse of justification, see
Modak-Truran, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law, supra note 144, at 477-81.
[VOL. 27:159
2007] BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I) 213
for certain application-specific legal rules, all legal norms are indetermi-
nate. 290 Given that the legal paradigm is a norm, Habermas must indicate
how it differs from other legal norms so that its indeterminacy does not
lead to an infinite regression. The liberal, social welfare, and proceduralist
legal paradigms offered by Habermas belie interpretation as application-
specific rules. Alexy characterizes them as "highly abstract" and claims
that "they are not sufficient for determining a definite decision," but "can
at most substantiate prima facie priorities between principles. '"2 91 Given
this abstraction, legal paradigms cannot do the work Habermas prescribes
for them, because they themselves are indeterminate.
Under these circumstances, judges would have to draw on extralegal
norms to decide hard cases. Elsewhere, I have argued that this means that
judges must rely on comprehensive or religious convictions to validate
these extralegal norms.2 92 Whether or not this is the case, Habermas
claims that relying on extralegal norms would undermine the rational and
impartial basis of judicial decisionmaking. It would shift the justification of
norms from the discourse of justification to the discourse of application.
As with legal hermeneutics, this would allow judges to rely on ethical and
historically relative legal norms rather than discursively justified or impar-
tially rational ones. Thus, if legal paradigms are indeterminate,
Habermas's discourse of application fails to maintain the secularization or
autonomy of law required by the modern paradigm of law and religion.
Finally, even if legal paradigms are determinate, this raises the issue
concerning how to define the nature and scope of legal paradigms.
Habermas claims that "[a] paradigm is discerned primarily in important
court decisions and usually equated with the judge's implicit image of soci-
ety. ' 293 Expressions like "social ideal," "social model," and "social vision"
have also become accepted ways of referring to a social epoch's legal para-
digm.2 94 He observes that "[s]uch expressions refer to those implicit ideas
or images of one's own society that provide a perspective for the practices
of making and applying law."2 95 Following Henry J. Steiner's account of
judicial social visions, Habermas recognizes that this implicit image of soci-
ety entails the judge's understanding of all of society. It includes the
judge's images of "socioeconomic structure, patterns of social interaction,
moral goals, and political ideologies. ' 296 It also includes a judge's beliefs
290. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 217.
291. Robert Alexy, Jirgen Habermas's Theory of Legal Discourse, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027,
1032 (1996).
292. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law, supra note 9 (arguing that the indeterminacy of the
United States' law requires judges to rely on religious or comprehensive convictions to justify their
deliberation about hard cases fully, even though they can only provide a partial justification of their
decisions in their written opinions in terms of noncomprehensive legal norms because of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment).
293. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 244, at 392.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. (quoting HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 92
(1987)).
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about social actors such as "their character, behavior, and capacities" and
her beliefs about things like accidents, including "their causes, volume[,]
and toll.
29 7
The scope of this social vision is very broad and includes not only de-
scriptive components (empirical claims about the current conditions of so-
ciety) but also normative components (normative claims about how society
should be organized and how citizens should conduct themselves).
Habermas even claims that legal paradigms have a "world-disclosive func-
tion" in that they "open up interpretive perspectives from which the princi-
ples of the constitutional state (in a specific interpretation) can be related
to the social context as a whole. 298 Moreover, he argues that the legal
paradigm "expresses a self-understanding of the legal community as a
whole. 299
With this broad scope, it is hard to distinguish social visions or legal
paradigms from comprehensive or religious convictions about authentic
human existence. If legal paradigms cannot be distinguished from religious
or comprehensive convictions, Habermas's discourse of application would
strangely be requiring judges to rely on something like comprehensive con-
victions in their decisionmaking. By requiring judges to rely on an official
legal paradigm or "self-understanding of the legal community,"
Habermas's discourse theory of law would in effect require establishing a
comprehensive conviction in violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. In addition, this would undermine Habermas's whole
attempt to provide an intersubjectively rational justification of law and vio-
late his normative understanding of secularization. Recall that Habermas's
normative account of secularization requires that the justification and ap-
plication of law must be sealed off from comprehensive and religious con-
victions in order to be rational. According to Habermas, comprehensive
and religious convictions are not rational, because they cannot be intersub-
jectively validated.
If solving the indeterminacy problem in the discourse of application
requires judges to rely on comprehensive or religious convictions,
Habermas would be solving the indeterminacy problem at the expense of
making judicial decisionmaking, on his account, nonrational. Like legal
hermeneutics, the discourse theory of law would be proposing that judges
decide hard cases based on something that is ethical and historical rather
than moral and impartial. Unless legal paradigms can be distinguished
from comprehensive convictions, the discourse of application cannot be ra-
tionally validated, and the normative "secularization of law" would para-
doxically require establishing the legal paradigm as the comprehensive or
religious norm for resolving hard cases. Habermas's discourse of applica-
tion would then fail to seal off judicial decisionmaking from religious or
comprehensive convictions that would undermine his core descriptive and
297. Id.
298. Id. at 437.
299. Id. at 223.
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normative claims about the secularization of law required to preserve the
modern paradigm of law and religion.
Even if legal paradigms can be distinguished from comprehensive con-
victions, Habermas's discourse theory of law is incoherent and requires an
establishment of a comprehensive or religious conviction. Habermas's dis-
course theory of justification and application rely on his claim that all com-
prehensive convictions are not rational and cannot be intersubjectively
validated. This claim constitutes a comprehensive denial of all comprehen-
sive convictions 3 -a hidden (negative) comprehensive liberal secularism.
However, this claim is self-contradictory because it presupposes what it de-
nies-the possibility of rational comprehensive evaluation. In addition,
those with differing comprehensive convictions would reject this compre-
hensive evaluation and the discourse theory of law. The discourse theory
of law would not be supported by an intersubjective agreement. In order
for the discourse theory of law to gain acceptance, this comprehensive eval-
uation would have to be established as part of the law. This would result in
a violation of the Establishment Clause (see Part VI. B. below), and the
discourse theory of law would fail to provide for the justification and appli-
cation of law independent of any particular comprehensive conviction.
Despite his substantial efforts, legal paradigms fail to maintain the sec-
ularization of the law either because they are indeterminate (allow reliance
on religious or comprehensive convictions) or because they are determi-
nate (require reliance on a nonrational comprehensive conviction which
makes the discoure theory incoherent and requires an establishment of re-
ligion). Habermas's normative theory of law-the discourse theory of
law-fails to preserve the independence of law from religion in the face of
legal indeterminacy. This suggests that the simultaneous endorsement of
these two assertions in contemporary legal theory under the modern para-
digm is misguided and that a new paradigm for law and religion is needed.
Consequently, Parts B and C have shown that giving up on the strong legal
formalism posited by Weber requires forfeiting the secularization of the
law (both descriptively and normatively) in ways not yet fathomed by con-
temporary legal theory.
VI. SECULARISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
French republican secularism shows more concretely the problematic
consequences that arise when comprehensive convictions-including the
liberal secularism presupposed by Rawls and Habermas-are embraced by
the state. Section VI will provide an overview of the French headscarf con-
troversy as vehicle for demonstrating the parallels between the French re-
publican secularism and the liberal secularism of Rawls and Habermas.
The secularism that is implicit with Rawls and Habermas becomes explicit
in the French headscarf crisis. This helps make it clear that secularism-
300. Gamwell, Metaphysics and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 289, at 230.
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whether the negative liberal form or the positive republican form-com-
petes with traditional religions like Islam for identifying authentic human
existence. The competition between traditional religion and secularism
further supports defining religion broadly to include secularism and other
so-called secular notions of authentic human existence. Moreover, both
these types of secularism fail to maintain the separation of law and religion
required by the modern paradigm and require establishing secularism as a
state religion contrary to a proper understanding of religious pluralism and
the Establishment Clause.3 °1
A. French Republican Secularism and Muslim Headscarves
In March 2004, the French National Assembly passed a law prohibiting
children from wearing clothing or insignia that "conspicuously manifest a
religious affiliation. '3 °2 The law was based on two commissions-one
formed by the French Parliament and the Stasi Commission which was ap-
pointed by President Jacques Chirac. These "two commissions voted with
near-unanimity for the law" that was then adopted by a large majority of
the French National Assembly and went into effect in September 2004. 303
This ban on religious symbols in public schools was based on Article 2
of the French Constitution, which provides that "France is a republic, indi-
visible, secular, democratic and social."3 4 The term "secular" in article 2 is
the usual English translation for the French term lai'citg. Despite this usual
translation, Jeremy Gunn notes that "laicit6 is used in France to summarize
prevailing beliefs regarding the proper relationship between religion and
the French state," but emphasizes that la'cit6 "is difficult to define and al-
most impossible to translate. '30 5 For instance, he notes that the Stasi Re-
port stated that lai'citg "rests on three interconnected values: 'liberty of
conscience, equality of rights in spiritual and religious choices, and neutral-
ity of political power. ' 3 6 Part A does not attempt to definitively sort out
the complicated French notion of laicit6 or secularism. Rather, the focus
will be to see how lafcit6 competes with religions like Islam to shape the
identity of French citizens and resident aliens.
Social anthropologist John Bowen indicates that the public debate
made it clear that the ban on wearing religious symbols in public schools
was "aimed at keeping Muslim girls from wearing headscarves in [public]
schools."30 7 Bowen engaged in an "anthropology of public reasoning" to
301. The normative aspects of religious pluralism prohibiting the state from cutting off the ongo-
ing process of pursuing religious truth will be discussed in more detail in Beyond Theocracy and Secu-
larism (Part II) along with a more detailed treatment of the normative implications of religious
pluralism for a constructive postmodern paradigm of law and religion.
302. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, at 5190.
303. JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE AND
PUBLIC SPACE 1 (2007).
304. ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 84 (1995)(emphasis added).
305. T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit: A Comparison of the United States and
France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420, 420 n.2.
306. Id. at 466.
307. BOWEN, supra note 303, at 1.
[VOL. 27:159
2007] BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART 1) 217
try to discern the significance of the debate about headscarves in France.
He approached this issue by asking "how French public figures understand
the proper relationships among religion, the state, and the individual, and
how they justify their arguments and policies in terms of concepts such as
lafcit6, Republicanism, and equality."3 °8 From his analysis, he discovered
that the headscarf issue was consistently linked to "three other social
problems: communalism, Islamism, and sexism" by public officials, journal-
ists, and intellectuals.30 9 All three of these issues relate to the failure of
Muslim immigrants to fulfill the French republican expectations of integrat-
ing into French culture and adopting "French" republican values.
For instance, Bowen defines "communalism (communautarisme)" as
"the closing of ethnically defined communities on themselves ... and the
refusal of integration."31 He notes a parallel between the "Jacobin" im-
pulse after the 1789 Revolution to attack guilds and religious orders as im-
peding common values and the contemporary criticism of Muslim
groups.311 Muslim groups are likewise criticized for constraining Muslims
"both by requiring them to follow certain rules (requiring girls to wear
scarves) and by keeping them from participating in emancipation through
immersion in state institutions, and that they follow a different authority
than that of the French state." '312 Similarly, the ambiguous term "Islamism
(islamisme)" "is used to refer to movements that advocate creating Islamic
states as well as to those that merely promote public manifestations of Is-
lam. '31 3 Finally, Bowen found that headscarves were linked to claims that
poor Muslims posed a danger to the equality of women because they held
misogynist attitudes and physically abused women.
Bowen found another revealing pattern in French explanations of la'c-
it6. His interviews and conversations revealed that the French held a col-
lective narrative of French citizenship.314 This narrative helps explain the
republican character of French secularism. The French narrative empha-
sizes a "Republican polis" going back to the Greeks which holds that the
key function of the state is to facilitate virtue and the good life.315 Like
other forms of republican political thought, French secularism has "insisted
308. Id. at 3.
309. Id. at 155.
310. Id. at 156.
311. Id. at 160.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 19.
315. BOWEN, supra note 303, at 15-16. Under republican notions of the state, the state functions
to help citizens to perfect their virtue and pursue the common good rather than the minimalist liberal
notion that the state functions primarily as a mechanism to resolve conflicting individual pursuits of the
good. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 114-22 (1990)(emphasiz-
ing Aristotlean roots of the revival of republicanism and the notion of civic virtue). See also Miriam
Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of
Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994). In this respect, Aristotle maintains that
"[p]olitical society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of living together." ARISTOTLE, THE
POLITICS, 1281a:2-3 (B. Jowett trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes
ed., rev. Oxford trans. 1984). The good of the individual is not a private affair but the public life of a
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on the primacy of the political domain as the space where citizens exper-
ienced their common values and interests." '316 French secularism further
emphasizes the republican "idea that one finds both liberty and order only
through the intervention of the state. ' 317 Moreover, French secularism
roughly follows the republican philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau-"liv-
ing together in a society requires agreement on basic values" and "requires
the state to construct institutions and policies designed to integrate
newborns and newcomers into French society by teaching them certain
ways of acting and thinking." '318
Bowen further indicates that the narrative turns rather quickly to a
genealogy of the wars of religion following the Reformation discussed in
Section II above. One public official emphasized that: "In French history,
we came out of the religious wars, both Catholics against Protestants and
then the Catholic Church against secularists, and then we developed the
system of laicit6. This limits the freedom of culte so as to prevent the
reemergence of wars. ' 319 The lesson from history, according to Bowen, is
that the French have come to embrace a "strong distinction between the
public practice of organized religion and the private activities characteristic
of one's personal religious beliefs."32 0 The discussion in Section II regard-
ing the shift from the pre-modern paradigm to the modern paradigm be-
cause of the wars of religion and the goal of privatizing religion seem to be
well rehearsed by the French.
Without more, the French notions of lafcit6, republicanism, and equal-
ity could be interpreted as mere political aspirations that the French value
more than religious liberty. From the Muslim perspective, however, these
notions and the genealogy that explains them appear to be much more than
then just politics. Rather, they go to the heart of French and European
identity. The French narrative only includes those who are, for the most
part, ethnically French and Christian or post-Christian. In an essay entitled
Muslims as a "Religious Minority" in Europe, anthropologist Talal Asad,
who is Muslim, emphasizes that "to the extent that 'France' embodies the
Jacobin narrative, it essentially represents the Christian and post-Christian
citizens who are constituted by it." '321 He further claims that "[t]he prob-
lem of understanding Islam in Europe is primarily ... a matter of under-
standing how 'Europe' is conceptualized by Europeans. Europe (and the
nation-states of which it is constituted) is ideologically constructed in such
a way that Muslim immigrants cannot be satisfactorily represented in it." '322
citizen is necessary for the individual's attainment of the highest good. For further discussion of Aris-
totle's republican political and legal theory, see Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revi-
val of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 263-67 (2000).
316. Id. at 160.
317. Id. at 19.
318. Id. at 11.
319. BOWEN, supra note 303, at 17.
320. Id. at 19.
321. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 175
(2003).
322. Id. at 159.
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Asad emphasizes that Europeans believe that "real Europeans acquire
their individual identities from the character of their civilization," so that
inhabitants "[w]ithout that civilizational essence" are not "'really' or 'fully'
European. "323 He also argues that Muslims are often "misrepresented in
the media and discriminated against by non-Muslims. 32 4 The exclusion of
Muslims helps clarify that the European identity derives from "key influ-
ences on European experience" including "the Roman Empire, Christian-
ity, the Enlightenment, and industrialization. 32 5 Asad's argument reverses
the charge from Muslim resistance to integration (communalism) to Euro-
pean (and particularly French) exclusion of Muslims and obliteration of
Muslim cultural influences on the history and experience of Europe.326
In addressing the French headscarf issue, Asad argues that "the
French secular state today abides in a sense by the curius region eius religio
principle (the religion of the ruler is the religion of his subjects), even
though it disclaims any religious allegiance and governs a largely irreligious
society. '3 27 Although not specifically identifying French secularism as a re-
ligion, Asad's comments suggest that French secularism is the "religion of
the ruler" that the French government imposes on its citizens to promote
social stability. Asad emphasizes that the Muslim headscarf symbolizes the
perceived Islamic threat to "the secular character of the [French] Repub-
lic."'328 Ironically, the French treatment of headscarves, although different
in degree, harkens back to the 16th century post-Reformation persecution
in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France and England of Christian groups not
following the ruler's chosen form of Christianity. Recall Harold Berman's
observation that in France, "[r]epression of Calvinism burst into civil war in
1562, and over the next thirty-six years a total of eight successive civil wars,
known collectively as the Wars of Religion, were fought by royal Roman
Catholic forces to put down the urban Huguenot uprisings. "329
The French government seems to have missed the chief lessons
learned from the wars of religion. Coercing uniformity of belief and prac-
tice under the pre-modern paradigm arguably triggered and certainly fu-
eled the wars of religion. The solution-embodied in the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) at the end of the Thirty Years War-required ruler's to
protect religious liberty and forego imposing the religion of the ruler on
those of other confessions of faith. Peace and a stable social order required
tolerance and respect for confessional differences not imposing a common
confession of faith.
323. Id. at 168.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 166.
326. For example, Asad notes that "[i]t is estimated that more than half the inhabitants of French
prisons are young Muslims of North African origin." Talal Asad, French Secularism and the "Islamic
Veil Affair," 8 HEDGEHOG REV. 93, 94 n. 3 (2006) (citing Jerusalem Report (6 May 2002))[hereinafter
Asad, French Secularism].
327. Id. at 94.
328. Id.
329. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 31, at 58-59.
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Despite these well-known lessons, the French prohibition of religious
symbols in public schools parallels these prior pre-modern enforcements of
religious uniformity. Asad emphasizes that many Muslim wearing head-
scarves in public believe it is a religious duty. They wear the veil but not
because Sharii law requires it. France has not adopted Sharidi law. Rather,
they wear it as an "act of piety" based on their conscience. Contrary to the
French government's public/private distinction, Asad emphasizes that "the
veil becomes for that reason an integral part of herself. For her it is not a
sign intended to communicate something but part of an orientation, of a
way of being."33 In other words, it makes no sense to tell Muslim school
girls that they can wear headscarves at home but not at school. It is part of
how they define themselves in public life as followers of Islam. The French
government, however, attempts to redefine for these girls what is required
by Muslim piety, or instead, to impose a French secular identity on them.
These comments should make apparent why French secularism consti-
tutes a comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human exis-
tence. Recall that Ogden's definition of religion discussed in Section III
above challenged the conventional distinction between what is "secular"
and what is "religion". Ogden maintains that any explicit comprehensive
conviction about human authenticity is a religion. Religion not only in-
cludes the recognized world religions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hin-
duism, and Buddhism, but it also includes humanism, capitalism (when
proposed as a normative rather than as a positive theory), communism, and
other so-called secular answers to the existential or comprehensive ques-
tion. In this respect, French secularism constitutes a comprehensive or re-
ligious conviction about authentic human existence because it defines how
citizens ought to live and dress in the public realm and specifies common
values and interests for French citizens. In addition, French secularism
views traditional religion as its main competition and prescribes compre-
hensive demands on French citizens that conflict with traditional religious
practices.
Like religious traditions, French secularism also provides a historical
narrative explaining the transition from a primarily Roman Catholic
French identity to a secular or post-Christian French identity. For instance,
the genealogy of French citizenship emphasizes the way French secularism
was "necessary" to overcome the wars of religion between the Protestants
and Catholics and between Catholics and secularists. During the 1789
Revolution, French secularism even trumped religious groups which were
abolished by the French legislature along with guilds as an impediment to
facilitating common French values and interests.331 The centrality of this
historical narrative to French secularism resembles traditional religious
narratives like the Exodus, which marks the liberation of Jews from slavery
under the pharaohs in Egypt.332 This is not to say that nations can't foster
330. Asad, French Secularism, supra note 326, at 96.
331. Id. at 160.
332. See generally, Exodus 1:1-15:27 (The Jerusalem Bible: Reader's Edition (1966)).
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genealogies of their origin. French secularism goes farther by requiring
that its genealogy trump or supersede religious narratives and religious
identities that pose little or no threat to the social order. All French citi-
zens must embrace the genealogy of French secularism and recognize its
comprehensive priority over private or personal genealogies including re-
ligious ones. For example, in the contemporary context, French secularism
competes with Islam for ultimate loyalty and requires prohibiting voluntary
acts of religious piety-like wearing headscarves-which seem to pose little
or no threat to the stability of the social order. Giving up headscarves sym-
bolizes the much deeper sacrifice of surrendering religious conceptions
about authentic human existence that is required to become properly
"French" and "European."
Although less thorough-going, the liberal secularisms of Rawls and
Habermas make similar comprehensive demands. Even though religious
convictions are the comprehensive condition of validity, Rawls requires
sacrificing these religious justifications for "political" values as the sole jus-
tification of the law. Like French secularism and other religious traditions,
Rawls provides a historical narrative that claims that "[m]oral philosophy
was always the exercise of free, disciplined reason alone. It was not based
on religion, much less on revelation, as civic religion was neither a guide
nor a rival to it."'333 Contrary to classical Greek political philosophy, he
blames Medieval Christianity for inappropriately basing politics on religion
rather than on reason (i.e., in my terms the pre-modern paradigm). Rawls
emphasizes that the reformers also adopted the pre-modern paradigm-
"Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the Roman Church
had been"-which led to the wars of religion among "rival authoritative
and salvationist religion[s]. 334 To return to rational politics, the narrative
concludes that citizens must rely on political values because all comprehen-
sive convictions are not rational.
Habermas similarly maintains the independence of law from religion
despite the threats posed by legal indeterminacy in the application of the
law. In hard cases, Habermas requires judges to rely solely on legal para-
digms-that appear suspiciously similar to comprehensive or religious con-
victions-as the basis for their decisions rather than personal moral,
political, or religious beliefs. According to Habermas, comprehensive and
333. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at xxiv. With respect to political liberalism,
Alasdair MacIntyre helpfully observes that
The starting points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between conceptions of human
good; they are always liberal starting points. And the inconclusiveness of the debates within
liberalism as to the fundamental principles of liberal justice (see After Virtue, chapter 17) rein-
forces the view that liberal theory is best understood, not at all as an attempt to find a rational-
ity independent of tradition, but as itself the articultion of an historically developed and
developing set of social instiution and forms of activity, that is, as the voice of a tradition. Like
other traditions, liberalism has internal to its own standards of rational justifiction. Like other
tranditions, liberalism has its set of authoritative texts and its disputes over their interpreta-
tion. Like other tranditions, liberalism expresses itself socially through a particular kind of
hierachy.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 345 (1988).
334. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 247, at xxv.
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religious convictions are not rational because they cannot be intersubjec-
tively validated. Both Rawls and Habermas require citizens and public of-
ficials to give up their comprehensive convictions as the comprehensive
condition of validity and to accept a (negative) comprehensive liberal secu-
larism (i.e., a comprehensive denial of comprehensive convictions). Only
those already subscribing to a (negative) comprehensive liberal secularism
like Rawls and Habermas will find this position "neutral" among religious
convictions as required by the modern paradigm. All others will under-
stand that Rawls and Habermas are advocating that the state should im-
pose comprehensive liberal secularism on them whether they agree with it
or not.
All three forms of secularism also maintain a unitary legitimation for
the law based on a particular understanding of secularism and require the
state to enforce compliance with and allegiance to that secularism. The
modern paradigm has been interpreted to require not only that law remain
autonomous from religion but also that the law must be legitimated by a
unitary secular foundation. The price of secularity for Rawls, Habermas,
and French secularism includes rejecting your religious convictions-the
comprehensive condition of normative validity-as not rational so that
everyone can accept the same "rational" foundation for the law. French
secularism made it clear that enforcing a unitary secular basis for the law
may further require sacrificing religious practices that pose little or no
threat to the social order. Moreover, these proposals for a unitary secular
foundation all attempted to replace traditional religious convictions with
secular comprehensive convictions under the illusion of neutrality.
B. Tensions Between Secularism and the Modern Paradigm
The attempt to replace religion with a unitary secular foundation
presents two significant problems for the modern paradigm. First, the uni-
tary secular foundation constitutes a continuation of the pre-modern relig-
ious justification of law by other means. Contrary to the modern
paradigm's autonomy of law and religion, these comprehensive "secular"
foundations for law could be characterized-in Pierre Schlag's terms-as a
"Continuation of God by Other Means." '3 35 Schlag argues that there is "a
certain form of reasoning very popular in American jurisprudence" which
bears "an uncanny and disturbing similarity to various proofs of God,"
such as "the cosmological proof, the argument from design, and the onto-
logical proof."'3 3 6 He concludes that "despite its secular pretensions, legal
thought is in part a kind of theological activity." '337 Similarly, Anthony
335. Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 427
(1997).
336. Id. at 427-28 (emphasis in original).
337. Id. at 428.
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Carty maintains that postmodern thought has shown that the modern con-
ception of law has failed on its own terms because it "incorporated funda-
mentally religious/metaphysical assumptions into its own categories of
thought. "338
While not actually identifying the comprehensive or religious nature of
liberal and republican secularism, the postmodern critique helps identify
that the unitary "secular" foundation of the modern paradigm arguably
continues the theocratic tendencies of the pre-modern paradigm in a
slightly different form. Rather than avoiding the divisiveness of traditional
religious beliefs, these versions of secularism just chose a different compre-
hensive conviction to legitimate the state. They did not provide a neutral
justification for the state but rather chose different gods to worship. This is
clearly seen by the competition in France between French secularism and
Islam. The religious practice of wearing headscarves posed no real threat
to the health, safety, or welfare of France. Yet, the French felt compelled
to coerce Muslim school girls to reject their religious duty to wear head-
scarves and to affirm their liberated "secular" identity as bareheaded
French girls. The main public policy reason to enforce this secular ortho-
doxy seems to be the preservation of the religion of the ruler-the post-
Christian French majority. The French government is the guardian of the
law's "secular" foundation in the same way that rulers under the pre-mod-
ern paradigm were guardians of the religious foundations of their territo-
ries. Thus, to the extent these unitary secular foundations define authentic
human existence, they are comprehensive or religious convictions, and the
modern paradigm constitutes a continuation rather than a break with the
pre-modern paradigm.
The second significant problem for the modern paradigm in the
United States stems from the Establishment Clause violations resulting
from the adoption of either the liberal or republican forms of secularism.
The Establishment Clause represents the most fundamental separation of
law and religion for the modern paradigm. If these versions of secularism
violate the Establishment Clause, this would further suggest the need for a
new paradigm of law and religion.
There is substantial disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices
about the parameters of the Establishment Clause. Scholars have often
identified three main positions taken by the Justices-strict separation,
neutrality, and accommodation-in their interpretations of the Establish-
ment Clause.3 39 These theoretical positions appear to influence the Jus-
tices' decisions quite substantially. For instance, even when the Justices all
338. Carty, supra note 211, at 2. Harold Berman similarly argues that "Western legal science is a
secular theology, which often makes no sense because its theological presuppositions are no longer
accepted". BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION I, supra note 31, at 165.
339. See, e.g., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 444-84 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer
eds., 2d ed. 1996) (dividing articles on the modern theories of the Establishment Clause into three main
groups: Strict Separation, Neutrality, and Accommodation); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1192-99 (3rd ed. 2006) (stating that there are "three major competing
approaches" to the Establishment Clause).
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apply the endorsement test, they apply the test differently and reach vastly
different results.34 °
Despite this disagreement, there has been long-standing agreement
among the Justices as to the most basic parameters of the Establishment
Clause. In the first case applying the Establishment Clause to a state stat-
ute, the Court articulated a strict separation position in stating that "[t]he
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. ' 341 More recently, Justice Kennedy, who advocates
substantial accommodation of religion by the state, has declared that "[i]t is
beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that gov-
ernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.' 3 42 At the very least, the Establishment
Clause appears to prohibit the state from explicitly embracing a particular
religious justification for the law.343 This prohibits judges and legislators
from articulating religious justifications in legal opinions or in statutory re-
quirements. By setting forth religious convictions in this manner, judges
and legislators would effectively establish those religious convictions as an
official religious justification for the law. Assuming that the secularism of
Rawls and Habermas and French secularism constitute religious convic-
tions, even this minimal understanding of the Establishment Clause would
prohibit the state from embracing and mandating compliance with any of
these forms of secularism.
340. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, the central issue was whether
the Federal government program for lending educational materials and equipment to public and private
schools (including parochial schools) violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 801. The plurality opin-
ion by Justice Thomas (joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy) took an Accommodation position
and held that the lending of educational materials and equipment to parochial schools does not violate
the Establishment Clause even if some of those materials are used for religious indoctrination. Id. at
809-10. By contrast, the concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor (joined by Breyer) took a Neutrality
position and argued that lending educational materials and equipment to parochial schools was consti-
tutional because there were reasonable safeguards to prevent diversion of materials for religious indoc-
trination and there was only evidence of de minimis diversion of materials for religious indoctrination.
Id. at 857-67. Finally, the dissenting opinion by Justice Souter (joined by Stevens and Ginsburg) took a
Strict Separation position and argued that the lending of educational materials and equipment to paro-
chial schools violated the Establishment Clause because of evidence of some actual diversion and a risk
of future diversion of these materials for religious indoctrination. Id. at 902-10.
341. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to a New Jersey law authorizing local school boards to repay parents for the cost of their
children's bus transportation to private schools).
342. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 678). In
this respect, Michael Perry argues that the essence of "the free exercise and nonestablishment norms is
that government may not make judgments about the value or disvalue-the true value, the moral value,
the social value, any kind of value-of religions or religious practices or religious (theological) tenets."
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 254, at 9. At the very minimum, he contends that the nonest-
ablishment norm means that the government may not take action favoring one or more religions as
such (in effect discriminating against others). By writing religious convictions into the law, the state
appears to be endorsing a religious conviction as true or favoring one religion over others. Id. at 14-16.
343. For a more extensive analysis of the Establishment Clause and religious convictions in gov-
ernment decision making, see Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law, supra note 9, at 765-774, 781-86.
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The Court has recognized some minor exceptions to this general pro-
hibition on the state endorsement of specific religious convictions including
the "statutorily prescribed national motto 'In God We Trust,"' and the
"compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate and the House and the mili-
tary services." 3" Former Chief Justice Burger refers to these accommoda-
tions of religion as "the Government's acknowledgment of our religious
heritage and governmental sponsorship of graphic manifestations of that
heritage." '345 However, none of these exceptions permit explicit reliance on
religious convictions as a justification for the law. These exceptions deal
with historic or symbolic recognitions of religion but do not rely on religion
as a justification for government decision making.
Both under the Lemon test and the endorsement test, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to require that laws have a
secular purpose and a primarily secular effect. Under Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,346 the Supreme Court specified three tests (collectively referred to as
the Lemon test) that all must be met for a statute to pass an Establishment
Clause challenge: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, [and] finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' 3 47 Although the Court has not
formally repudiated the Lemon test, "[a] majority of the justices sitting in
2003 have criticized it, and it has not been relied on by a majority to invali-
date any practice since 1985. "34' For instance, both Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia have advocated abandoning the Lemon test and, in
particular, have severely criticized the secular purpose prong.3 49
In place of the Lemon test, many of the Justices have embraced the
"endorsement test," which was originally proposed by Justice O'Connor in
344. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
345. Id. at 677.
346. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
347. Id. at 612-13.
348. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (3rd ed. 2008).
349. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Lemon test and arguing that "[t]he secular purpose prong has proven mercurial in application because
it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to operate"). In his
dissenting opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Scalia contended that the secular purpose prong
should be abandoned and argued that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statue
is to be honest, almost always an impossible task." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia further maintained that there was "relatively little information upon
which to judge the motives of those who supported the Act," and that it was not clear what source of
the legislators intent should be controlling. Id. at 619, 637-38. He also declared that it is not clear "how
many of them must have the invalidating intent" and suggested that an invalid intent by the bill's
sponsor may be enough. Id. at 638. Moreover, he argued that "[t]o look for the sole purpose of even a
single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist." Id. at 637. Scalia noted that a
legislator in that case may have voted for several reasons such as fostering religion or education, provid-
ing "jobs for his district," responding to "a flood of constituent mail," or "accidentally voted 'yes' in-
stead of 'no,' or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of the
above and many other motivations." Id. But see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Cross-
roads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 143 (1992) (arguing that "it would be unprincipled to abandon the
purpose prong of the Lemon test on these grounds if the Court intends to inquire into legislative pur-
pose in other contexts").
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her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.35 ° The endorsement test has
two prongs: 1) the "purpose prong . . . asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion;" and 2) "[t]he effect prong
asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.,
351
With respect to the purpose prong, Justice O'Connor has argued that "the
secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be determinative in striking
down a statute" but that "[i]t reminds government that when it acts it
should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice that
all citizens do not share. '352  With respect to the effect prong, Justice
O'Connor emphasizes that "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice
not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion. ' 353 Consequently, under both the Lemon
test and the endorsement test, the Court has required that laws must have a
secular purpose and a primarily secular effect to meet the requirements of
the Establishment Clause.
While I assume that government adoption of a religious justification
for the law clearly has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion (i.e.,
violates the effect prong), the secular purpose analysis is not as straight
forward. The Supreme Court has held in only five cases that statutes or
other government activity advancing or protecting explicit religious teach-
ings (e.g., the Ten Commandments and Creation Science) or religious prac-
tices (e.g., meditation or voluntary prayer) were unconstitutional because
they lacked a secular purpose.354 In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court clari-
fied that "[a] religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a
350. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Just five years later, a majority of the Justices applied the endorsement
test in their analysis of whether a creche in the county courthouse and a menorah in front of a city-
county building constituted an establishment of religion. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
579 (1989) (holding that the creche violated the Establishment Clause but that the menorah did not).
More recently, all the members of the Court have explicitly applied the endorsement test or joined in
opinions applying the test. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (holding that lending educational materials and
equipment to public and private schools (including parochial school) does not violate the Establishment
Clause).
351. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "[t]he endorsement test is
useful because of the analytic content it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose
and effect).
352. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
353. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
354. McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding the display of the Ten Commandments inside court-
houses in Kentucky unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause because the display was moti-
vated by a predominantly religious purpose); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591 (holding unconstitutional
Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruc-
tion Act" because "[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 & 61 (hold-
ing unconstitutional Alabama's statute providing for a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary
prayer" because the law lacked a secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-41 (1980) (holding
that a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school
classroom in the State unconstitutional because it had a "pre-eminent" religious purpose); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding unconstitutional an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teach-
ing of evolution in public schools and universities because the "sole reason" for the anti-evolution law
was "that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpre-
tation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group").
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state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate." '355 In these
five cases, the statutes or other government activity violated the Establish-
ment Clause because they were based on a predominant religious purpose
rather than merely recognizing the symbolic or historic significance of relig-
ion. Similarly, under both the Lemon test and the endorsement test, adopt-
ing comprehensive secularism (under the modern paradigm) or a more
traditional religious conviction (under the pre-modern paradigm) as the
justification for government activity would constitute a predominent relig-
ious purpose. Religious convictions are the comprehensive condition of
normative validity for all normative claims including legal ones. Conse-
quently, if the state adopts religious convictions to justify its actions, the
religious convictions by definition outweigh or predominate all other justi-
fications for those actions and thereby violate the Establishment Clause.
However, in McGowan v. Maryland,35 6 the Supreme Court rejected
the claim that the Establishment Clause is violated by "federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." '357 The Court further
emphasized that:
In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures con-
clude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from
any religious considerations, demands such regulation.
Thus, for temporal purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact
that this agrees with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian re-
ligions while it may disagree with others does not invalidate
the regulation. So too with the questions of adultery and
polygamy. The same could be said of theft, fraud, etc., be-
cause those offenses were also proscribed in the
Decalogue.358
Even though the Sunday closing law originally had a religious origin, the
Court rejected the Establishment Clause challenge because having "a uni-
form day of rest" was a significant secular purpose for such a law.35 9 Harris
v. McRae360 presented a similar challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which
prohibits federal Medicaid funds for most abortions. The plaintiffs argued
355. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (stating that "the First Amendment
requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion");
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (emphasizing that "[t]he Court has invalidated legislation or governmental ac-
tion on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no
question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations").
356. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
357. Id. at 442.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 445. Cf. Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establish-
ment Clause, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the case law and doctrines that
comprise contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence support his claim "that laws that are dis-
cernibly informed by religious moral premises" generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the First
Amendment).
360. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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that "the Hyde Amendment violates the Establishment Clause because it
incorporates into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church concern-
ing the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life commences. "361
The Court held that the Hyde Amendment could just as well be "a reflec-
tion of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion" and that mere coincidence
with Roman Catholic religious tenets, "without more," does not constitute
an Establishment Clause violation.
362
Given this Supreme Court precedent, the secular purpose requirement
must mean that the text of the law can only provide a noncomprehensive
justification for its requirements. For example, criminal statutes prohibit-
ing murder do not reference the Christian Bible, the Torah, or the Koran to
justify this prohibition. The possible comprehensive justifications remain
implicit. Similarly, judges should not cite passages from Genesis, Leviticus,
and St. Thomas Aquinas, like Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama
Supreme Court has done, to justify "a strong presumption of unfitness"
against homosexual parents for custody of their children.363 When judges
reference only cases, statutes, legal principles, or public policy arguments,
their opinions only provide noncomprehensive justifications for their deci-
sions. The law implies comprehensive justifications but does not explicitly
incorporate those comprehensive justifications into the law. Thus, the Su-
preme Court precedent requiring that the law have "a secular purpose"
does not prohibit the law from implying a plurality of religious convictions
as a foundation for law under a constructive postmodern paradigm of law
and religion (See Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part II). Rather, the
secular purpose requirement prohibits adopting comprehensive convictions
as a justification for the law. This includes liberal or republican forms of
comprehensive secularism that attempt to mask their comprehensive or re-
ligious convictions as requirements that are neutral or impartial among dif-
ferent religions. As a result, contary to the autonomy of law required by
the modern paradigm, these forms of secularism represent a continuation
of theocracy by other means and violate the Establishment Clause.
361. Id. at 319.
362. Id. at 319-20. By contrast, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services that a Missouri law regulating abortion was unconstitutional for various reasons includ-
ing a violation of the Establishment Clause. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566
(1989). He argued that "the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life
begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the pre-
amble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
Id. Rather than maintaining that this statement merely coincided with certain religious tenets or that
legislators were motivated by religious considerations, he maintained "that the preamble, an unequivo-
cal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths, serves no identifiable
secular purpose. That fact alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 566-67. This may serve as a warning that judges should avoid taking positions on mat-
ters such as when life begins or ends. As indicated in Part V, these are essentially religious questions
and unnecessarily answering them may lead judges to make their implicit comprehensive convictions
needlessly explicit.
363. See Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Isolating paradigms of law and religion has helped reveal key assump-
tions about law, religion, and their relationship that are rarely examined
because they are reflexively taken for granted. The secularization of the
law represents the most widely-held but least examined assumption of the
modern paradigm of law and religion. In order to facilitate some critical
distance on contemporary assumptions about secularization, I first ana-
lyzed its origin as a reaction to the religious pluralism and wars of religion
in the sixteenth and seventeenth century resulting from the Protestant Ref-
ormation. The Reformation divided the Western part of the Christian tra-
dition into separate confessional institutions including Roman Catholic,
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anabaptist institutions. Each of these confessions
professed different theological interpretations of Christianity and its rela-
tionship to politics and law. Under the pre-modern paradigm, the religion
of the ruler was the religion of the state and was imposed on dissenters to
promote uniformity of belief and social stability. This produced conflict
and eventually war among these confessional institutions for control of the
state. This historical experience dramatically demonstrated the compre-
hensive nature of religious convictions and the religious pluralism that has
become a permanent characteristic of Western culture.
Faced with the devastating wars of religion, the modern paradigm at-
tempted to replace the religious legitimation of law under the pre-modern
paradigm with a secular legitimation based on the Enlightenment notion of
reason. The secular legitimation of law attempted to separate law and re-
ligion into autonomous spheres so that a plurality of religious traditions
could coexist within a state. Under the modern paradigm, law dictated the
place of religion in society and did not require religious legitimation. Law
had a rational foundation that was "neutral" among the various religious
confessions in a particular state. For Max Weber, the secularization or ra-
tionalization of law finally led to the autonomy of law as a formalistic sys-
tem and a "legal science". In its ideal form, he maintained that the legal
system constitutes "a gapless 'legal ordering' of all social conduct" which
seals law off from morality, politics, and religion.364
Contrary to Weber's complete separation of law and religion, two
quandaries or crises for legal theory-legal indeterminacy and the onto-
logical gap between legal theory and legal practice-have called into ques-
tion the modern paradigm and its notion of secularization of the law. Legal
theorists (ranging from extreme-radical deconstructionists to contemporary
legal formalists) overwhelmingly agree that the law is indeterminate and
reject the strong legal formalism that secured the autonomy of law for
Weber. The law is indeterminate because there are hard cases where the
apparently relevant statutes, common law, contracts, or constitutional law
provisions at issue fail to resolve disputes. From a descriptive standpoint,
legal indeterminacy merely means that judges must rely on extralegal
364. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 168, at 658.
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norms to resolve hard cases. This may result in judges relying on religious
norms in contravention to the secularization of the law. As a result, the
advent of legal indeterminacy has called into question the secularization of
the law as a descriptive assumption.
Legal indeterminacy thus shifts the burden of maintaining the seculari-
zation of law to normative theories of law. Within the modern paradigm,
these normative theories require judges and legislators to justify the law
without relying on religious convictions. Sections V and VI evaluated the
main types of liberal and republican normative theories of law under the
modern paradigm-represented by John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and
French secularism-that attempt to legitimate the law independently of re-
ligious or comprehensive convictions. Each of these theories was shown to
fail for several of the following reasons: 1) they denied legal indeterminacy;
2) they were incoherent; or 3) they required establishing a comprehensive
secularism in violation of the Establishment Clause and a proper under-
standing of religious pluralism.
To clarify the discussion of religion, Ogden's account of religion and
religious pluralism were set forth. Ogden maintains that any explicit com-
prehensive conviction about human authenticity is a religion. Religion not
only includes the recognized world religions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam,
Hinduism, and Buddhism, but it also includes humanism, capitalism (when
proposed as a normative rather than as a positive theory), communism, and
other so-called secular answers to the existential or comprehensive ques-
tion. In this respect, French secularism constitutes a comprehensive or re-
ligious conviction about authentic human existence because it defines how
citizens ought to live and dress in the public realm and specifies common
values and interests for French citizens. Although less thorough-going, the
liberal secularisms of Rawls and Habermas make similar comprehensive
demands.
French republican secularism showed more concretely the problematic
consequences that arise when comprehensive convictions-including the
liberal secularism presupposed by Rawls and Habermas-are embraced by
the state. The secularism that is implicit with Rawls and Habermas became
explicit in the French headscarf crisis. This helped make it clear that secu-
larism-whether the negative liberal form or the positive republican
form-competes with traditional religions like Islam for identifying authen-
tic human existence. In this respect, the modern paradigm was shown to be
a coninuation of the pre-modern paradigm by other means. The price of
secularity for Rawls, Habermas, and French secularism included rejecting
your religious convictions-the comprehensive condition of normative va-
lidity-as not rational so that everyone can accept the same "rational"
foundation for the law. French secularism also made it clear that enforcing
a unitary secular foundation for the law may further require sacrificing
harmless religious practices like wearing headscarves in public school that
pose little or no threat to the social order. Moreover, all of these forms of
secularism failed to maintain the separation of law and religion required by
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the modern paradigm and required establishing secularism as a state relig-
ion contrary to a proper understanding of religious pluralism and the Es-
tablishment Clause. The failure of these forms of secularism suggests that
the simultaneous endorsement of legal autonomy and legal indeterminacy
under the modern paradigm is misguided and that a new paradigm for law
and religion is needed. Thus, giving up on the strong legal formalism pos-
ited by Weber requires forfeiting the secularization of the law (both de-
scriptively and normatively) in ways not yet fathomed by contemporary
legal theory.
This critique of the modern paradigm facilitated identifying the key
assumptions about law and religion-such as secularization-that are often
invisible to legal theorists because they are taken for granted. From the
arguments and analysis in this article, it should be clear that a constructive
postmodern paradigm must take into account the following factors about
religion and law: 1) the comprehensive and narrative nature of religion; 2)
the existence and normative implications of religious pluralism; 3) the con-
sensus about legal indeterminacy; 4) the secularized text of the law; and 5)
the need to close the ontological gap between legal theory and legal prac-
tice. The modern paradigm failed to reconcile these factors about law and
religion into a coherent or adequate theory so that a new constructive
postmodern paradigm of law and religion is needed to accomplish this task.
In Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part II): A New Paradigm for
Law and Religion, my aim will be to provide a constructive postmodern
paradigm that can reconcile these factors. Thomas Kuhn argues that show-
ing flaws in paradigms is never enough to motivate others to reject the
paradigm. Paradigm shifts require a new paradigm that solves crises-like
legal indeterminacy and the ontological gap-that have eluded other para-
digms. My thesis maintains that closing the ontological gap and providing a
normative theory of law consistent with legal indeterminacy requires a
desecularization of law and a return to a religious legitimation of law.
While the detailed argument will have to wait for Part II, Beyond Theoc-
racy and Secularism (Part I) has laid out the trajectory for a new construc-
tive postmodern paradigm of law and religion that embraces legal
indeterminacy as a structural characteristic of law which allows for a plural-
ity of religious convictions to implicitly legitimate the law and thereby close
the ontological gap. A unitary religious (pre-modern) or secular (modern)
legitimation of law appears to be an outdated or erroneous assumption of
pre-modern and modern paradigms. It fails to take religious pluralism seri-
ously. Rather than proposing a fixed, unitary foundation for the law, I will
argue that the legitimation of law depends on the plurality of religious and
comprehensive convictions in the culture. Under the constructive
postmodern paradigm, the text of the law must be explicitly secularized
(i.e., no explicit recognition of religion), but at the same time, the law is
implicitly legitimated by a plurality of religious foundations. The construc-
tive postmodern paradigm of law and religion thus leads to the desecu-
larization of the law.
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Desecularization of the law does not suggest returning to an explicitly
religious legitimation of law under the pre-modern paradigm like Former
Chief Justice Roy Moore's attempt to enshrine the Ten Commandmens as a
symbol of "the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state
and the church." '365 While not technically a theocracy, Moore's position
presupposes the pre-modern paradigm and attempts to impose a de facto
Christian religious foundation on "the world's most religiously diverse na-
tion." '366 The Establishment Clause and a proper understanding of relig-
ious pluralism prohibit the law from explicitly adopting a religious
legitimation. Also, reviving the pre-modern paradigm would foolishly ig-
nore the lessons learned from the wars of religion after the Reformation.
Although claiming to follow the modern paradigm, French secularism
boiled down to a continuation of the pre-modern paradigm by other
means. French secularism has forgotten these lessons and unnecessarily
fueled conflict with French Muslims by prohibiting acts of Muslim piety
(i.e., wearing headscarves) and imposing the religion of the ruler (i.e.,
French secularism) on French Muslims. Advocating a return to the pre-
modern paradigm suggests that this position is the only alternative to the
modern paradigm or the only one allowing for a religious legitimation of
law.
Alternatively, the law may have a plurality of foundations which com-
pete for allegiance and produce contradictory norms within the law. Bridg-
ing the ontological gap requires a new constructive postmodern paradigm
that recognizes that a plurality of religious convictions implicitly legitimates
the law. The constructive postmodern paradigm does not propose a uni-
tary religious ontological foundation for law. Rather, it claims that each
individual interpreting the law presupposes a religious ontological founda-
tion. Ogden's definition of religion made it clear that religious convictions
are the comprehensive condition of validity presupposed by any normative
judgment. Also, recall that religious or comprehensive convictions include
both an ethical aspect (a notion of authentic human existence) and a meta-
physical aspect (the meaning of ultimate reality for us). 367 The ontological
gap implicitly acknowledges that each act of legal interpretation presup-
poses a religious ontology and a notion of authentic human existence.
Taken collectively, there is a plurality of religious ontologies implicitly le-
gitimating the law and closing the ontological gap.
At the same time, the secularization of law still has a normative mean-
ing based on a proper understanding of religious pluralism and the Estab-
lishment Clause. To prevent cutting off the debate for religious truth and
violating the Establishment Clause, the state may not embrace a particular
religious conviction or religious tradition (i.e., the Ten Commandments)
365. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284 (affirming that the monument violated the Establishment Clause
and the order to remove it).
366. See generally ECK, supra note 29 (chronicling the increasing diversity of American religious
practice and proposing a pluralistic vision for a new America).
367. See supra note 111.
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and the law may not adopt a religious justification.368 The text of the law
must remain secularized so that it includes only noncomprehensive rules
and principles. Nevertheless, the secularized text of the law does not mean
that the law has an autonomous secular foundation (i.e., secularism). In
Democracy and Tradition, religion scholar Jeffrey Stout argues that
"[t]here is a sense in which the ethical discourse of most modern democra-
cies is secularized, for such discourse is not 'framed by a theological per-
spective' taken for granted by all those who participate in it."
369
Secularized discourse, however, "is not a reflection of commitment to secu-
larism."37 Stout further emphasizes that a secularized modern democratic
discourse does not "involve endorsement of the 'secular state' as a realm
entirely insulated from the effects of religious convictions, let alone re-
moved from God's ultimate authority. It is simply a matter of what can be
presupposed in a discussion with other people who happen to have differ-
ent theological commitments and interpretive dispositions."371
However, the law implies religious or comprehensive convictions
about authentic human existence. The legitimation of law is provided by a
plurality of religious and comprehensive convictions which must always re-
main implicit. For example, many religious or comprehensive convictions
support the legal prohibition of murder, but the text of the law does not
explicitly adopt any of these religious justifications. In other words, the
text of the law does not provide a religious or comprehensive justification
for prohibiting murder but only implies them. Religious pluralism and the
Establishment Clause require this normative theory of secularization.
Despite the secularization of the text of the law, this new paradigm
results in a legitimate plurality of religious convictions implicitly legitimat-
ing the law and thereby desecularizing the law. The trajectory for this new
constructive postmodern paradigm of law and religion has been shown to
embrace legal indeterminacy as a necessary structural characteristic of law
to provide for a pluralistic religious legitimation of law that will close the
ontological gap while maintaining the secularization of law in the sense that
the text of the law makes no explicit recognition of any official religious
foundation. The plurality of religious foundations are only implied by the
law. A more detailed account of this new constructive postmodern para-
digm will have to wait for a subsequent article entitled Beyond Theocracy
and Secularism (Part II): A New Paradigm for Law and Religion.
368. See Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d at 26 (Moore, C.J., concurring) (citing passages from Genesis,
Leviticus, and St. Thomas Aquinas to justify "a strong presumption of unfitness" against homosexual
parents for custody of their children).
369. Stout, supra note 2, at 93.
370. Id. Like Ogden, Stout considers secularism an ideology that competes with religious tradi-
tions for ultimate commitment. Id. at 97.
371. Id.
